A game theoretic representation of bargaining between two parties, from "Game Theory and Ethics", The Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy
The new Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, on the cusp of crucial negotiation with Greece's European creditors, recently declared in the New York Times that he was not "playing games" and did not view the current deliberations between Greece and its creditors as a bargaining contest "to be won or lost via bluffs and tactical subterfuge" ("No Time for Games in Europe", New York Times, Feb 16, 2015). Unsurprisingly, many commentators (the current author included) immediately interpreted this as a classic - and potentially brilliant - tactical move in the bargaining game Varoufakis was actually engaged in at the time. After all, the purpose of Varoufakis' article was to convince the reader that the new Greek government's "red lines" in its negotiations with Europe were indeed red lines, and would not be crossed under any circumstances.
