In attempting to reduce human rights abuses, both academics and practitioners focus on two mechanisms that can, at least at times, lead to respect for human rights. First, when social norms change, individuals may come to see themselves as human rights compliers or respecters and may come to view some government practices as improper. This is the logic of appropriateness. Second, legal rules, when enforced, can impose costly sanctions on those who violate human rights. This is the logic of consequences.
Leaders do not generally commit human rights abuses themselves; they order them.
In our research, Tiberiu Dragu and I use a game-theory model to argue that a third mechanism can also work to improve human rights practices under certain conditions: the logic of expectations. A key point in developing this logic is that leaders do not generally commit human rights abuses themselves; they order them. The leader’s agents—be they military, police, or other security agents—are tasked with violations, and whether they follow those orders depends in part on whether they expect others to do so.
