I have worked in monitoring and evaluation in large organizations for more than 15 years, and the question my colleagues always asked was: “Is it possible to talk to the enemy?” By enemy, they meant the targets of campaigns against human rights violations: police forces, armies, and politicians suspected of physical or political violence.
It's a good question—one that goes to the core of monitoring and evaluation work. On one hand, speaking with these groups helps us understand our targets more, and evaluate whether our campaigns are having any impact. But on the other hand, my colleagues believed that this was an impossible task. Would these people talk to us? Could their information be trusted? Might consulting with abusers expose campaigners to reputational risk? Would it also offer them the chance to learn about us, and to weaken our campaigns?
Not only is it possible to talk with the targets of campaigns, it also makes good sense to do so. My experience, however, suggests that framing these people as “the enemy” from the start can do a disservice to all sides. Not only is it possible to talk with the targets of campaigns, it also makes good sense to do so. I will not claim this is feasible in all instances: there is a calculation of risk versus benefit that must take place, which depends on the context, issue, and whether the evaluation takes place after the campaign. It is not wise, for example, to approach government officials in charge of highly repressive regimes, or where talking with them could jeopardize campaign actions. But in the many instances when talking to the enemy is feasible, it offers a unique chance to challenge our own assumptions of how and why change happens. It also gives important insights about how to influence our targets in the future.
