At the outset of the Iraq war, five different projections of its character and timescale were available. After eight days of fighting, which now seems most convincing? And does the unthinkable US defeat remain so?
After eight days of war in Iraq, there is growing evidence that the campaign is not going the way the US and Britain wanted or expected. The situation remains very fluid, with an enormous amount of misinformation coming from both sides.
One way to try and make some sense of it is to examine the range of possible outcomes. On this basis, and on a best estimate, there were at the outset of war five ways in which it could have been expected to go to a conclusion. Each outcome had a different duration, ranging from one-to-two weeks to a year or more. These will be examined in turn.
The first outcome: Shock and Awe
The shock and awe tactic of massive bombing of the Iraqi leadership and military causes the immediate collapse of the regime, and the assassination of Saddam Hussein, with little or no fighting on the ground. Duration: 3-5 days.
While events have already made this estimate redundant, a version of it is still just possible over a longer timescale, especially if the US returns to the intensive city centre bombing of the third night of the war and succeeds in destroying the Iraqi leadership, including Saddam Hussein himself. It remains unlikely, partly because the US is limited in its bombing campaign by the need to avoid civilian casualties, and because the Iraqi leadership is both dispersed and well-protected.
The second outcome: quick victory
The leadership survives the initial bombing, coalition troops move rapidly towards Baghdad, unimpeded by Iraqi forces. In southern cities they are welcomed and there are anti-regime rebellions. The Republican Guard is engaged and defeated, largely by air power, outside of Baghdad, and the Special Republican Guard disperses. Baghdad is occupied with little conflict. The regime collapses. Duration: 1-3 weeks.
This is still possible but frankly very unlikely. There has been surprisingly little welcome for coalition troops. Basra was expected to be liberated within a couple of days but remains in regime hands. US troops are being harried by militia and fedayeen, and neither they nor the British have achieved full control of south-east Iraq. The regime appears firmly in control in Baghdad. There has been little in the way of rebellion.
There is now some evidence that the Republican Guard is willing to fight, contrary to the expectations of many analysts who saw the much smaller Special Republican Guard as being the main problem for the US. The Republican Guard has forces deeply protected south of Baghdad and is subject to intensive bombing, but some units repelled a substantial air attack by US Apache helicopters earlier this week, bringing one and possibly two down and damaging many more, much to the surprise of US commanders. Attacks against extended supply lines from Kuwait towards Baghdad are causing problems. The weather has not helped.
The third outcome: slow victory
The Republican Guard fights but is defeated. The Special Republican Guard is eventually defeated in Baghdad. There are limited uprisings. The regime collapses with thousands of military casualties and hundreds of civilians killed. Duration: 4-8 weeks.
This is certainly still possible, but would require substantial US reinforcements into southern Iraq accompanied by air-lifted troops to open a new front north of Baghdad, splitting Iraqi defences. Both may now be happening, but heavy resistance by the Special Republican Guard and Iraqi Special Forces could lead to substantial US casualties. The regional and international political impact would be considerable, with the anti-American and anti-British mood increasing greatly.
The fourth outcome: long war
The Republican Guard fights outside Baghdad first and then retreats to pre-prepared defensive positions in the suburbs. There is an eventual defeat but the Special Republican Guard, fedayeen and other forces fight on for weeks in the city. Substantial further US reinforcements are called in and there is consistent use of heavy firepower in the city during a siege in which US forces slowly encroach on the centre. They eventually occupy Baghdad and destroy the regime but not without even higher civilian casualties. The US is unable to succeed by the end of May; the war slows down through the heat of the summer until the autumn. Duration: up to 8 months.
This is quite possible and would be a humanitarian disaster. It would also have huge political implications for George Bush and would threaten Tony Blairs position. The regional and international impact of sustained warfare in an ancient Arab city, as well as considerable loss of civilian life, would further intensify anti-American and anti-British feelings across the region, with unpredictable consequences.
The fifth outcome: defeat
This is an extension of the previous outcome, except that the elite Iraqi forces and irregular guerrilla groups tie down US forces for an extended period, with the regime surviving through next winter. There is instability in several Arab states as popular sentiments require support for Iraq. This instability is compounded by harsh action by Ariel Sharons Israeli government in southern Lebanon following missile attacks directed at Haifa. US and UK forces in the region are subject to paramilitary attacks. A messy ceasefire is eventually agreed under UN auspices, and the UN takes a leading role in trying to restore some sense of stability in the face of many tens of thousands of casualties and a wrecked Iraq. Duration: uncertain.
The probable outcome
At present the US and Britain are obliged to face up to something between a slow victory and a long war. The extent of Iraqi guerrilla actions has come as a surprise, but even more remarkable has been the ability of Iraqi forces to inflict damage on US equipment, most notably the response to the Apache helicopter attack.
Although there could still be a sudden and rapid collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, this looks decreasingly likely. One consequence is that the US plan for a rapid march on Baghdad using relatively light but highly mobile forces is proving difficult to carry out.
At the same time, we should not underestimate the absolute determination of the Bush administration to succeed in terminating the Iraqi regime. If there were any prospect of the war dragging on into the summer, there would be a major intensification of US operations in late April and May.
Defeat, the fifth option, is utterly unthinkable. If it were to happen, it would destroy not just the US strategy for the region, threatening its control of Gulf oil, but would fatally damage the whole Project for the New American Century that lies at the heart of the neo-conservative security agenda in Washington.
