Although the United States continues to face major difficulties in Iraq, the Bush administrations attitude to the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains firm: if it considers a country to be a threat to the US or its interests, and if that country is developing nuclear weapons, then pre-emptive military action is one option that will be actively considered and even implemented.
Last week, the North Korean authorities announced that they had completed reprocessing 6,000 spent reactor fuel rods, a process that could provide them with enough plutonium to produce perhaps six nuclear bombs. There is no confirmation of this; indeed, it contrasts with the view of independent analysts that North Korea may possibly have produced just one or two nuclear weapons.
It may well be that North Korea is exaggerating its capabilities to provide some kind of deterrent against US action, just as the Saddam Hussein regime may have done to an even greater extent, but it is certainly the case that the North Korean government will use such a statement as a diplomatic bargaining chip.
Its move comes at a time of claims in Washington that the third part of the axis of evil, Iran, is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. Whatever their truth, it is necessary to put the possible nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran in a wider context, especially as these developments come at a time when the United States has all but given up on most forms of traditional nuclear arms control.
The worlds nuclear inventory
During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union developed extraordinarily large nuclear arsenals. The collective total of bombs and warheads - ranging from mines, torpedoes, artillery shells and anti-aircraft missiles through to massive multi-megaton warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles was as high as 70,000.
Many of the long-range missiles built in the latter stages of the cold war were astonishingly accurate and gave rise to fears of disarming first strike policies that could make crises extremely dangerous; it is now clear that there were several occasions when the superpowers came close to using nuclear weapons.
At the same time, there were some progressive developments. A nuclear arms race between Argentina and Brazil was averted in the mid-1980s; Taiwan and South Korea were persuaded to limit their nuclear ambitions; and in the immediate aftermath of the cold war nuclear weapons were withdrawn by Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, while South Africa dismantled its small nuclear arsenal.
Even so, the worlds nuclear arsenals remain large, and none of the eight nuclear powers (the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, Israel, India and Pakistan) show any sign whatsoever of renouncing their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, they are all engaged in modernising them, not least in ways that may make some of them more useable in crises that fall far short of worldwide nuclear war.
The United States, for example, currently has some 7,650 nuclear warheads actively deployed, with a further 3,000 in reserve or awaiting dismantling. Most of these weapons are strategic - and far more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb - but there are substantial numbers of tactical bombs of the B-61 group, including the B61-11 earth-penetrating bomb developed in the 1990s. The US retains a facility at Los Alamos for producing new nuclear weapons although no new designs are currently in production.
There have, however, recently been clear moves towards the development of new designs, especially of small nuclear weapons for specific uses in counter-proliferation activities such as destruction of deeply-buried targets. There are also proposals for investing in the refurbishment of the Nevada nuclear test site to make it easier to resume nuclear testing should that be considered necessary.
Such planning takes place in the context of an acknowledged commitment to pre-emptive action against potential nuclear weapons states, and also comes at a time when the United States is developing missile defences. If these could be made to work, then the United States would be the only country in the world that could offer some kind of defence against nuclear attack while retaining very powerful offensive nuclear forces. This possibility is of real concern to Russia and China in particular.
Meanwhile, much of Russias nuclear infrastructure including its submarine fleet - is in a severely decayed condition. There are reported to be over 8,000 warheads in active deployment and 10,000 in reserve or more awaiting disassembly, but the actual number of active warheads may be very much lower.
Russian nuclear policy appears now to concentrate on retaining a relatively small core of nuclear forces, including a process of progressive modernisation such as the enhancement of the Tu-160 strategic bomber. While the United States and Russia have agreed to cut their nuclear forces to around 2,000 active strategic warheads by 2012, the agreement does not include tactical systems, nor does it involve dismantling existing warheads which can therefore be maintained in reserve.
Meanwhile, the British, French and Chinese nuclear forces have all undergone a transition since the end of the cold war but, in all cases, withdrawal of obsolete weapons has been accompanied by a modernisation of key systems. Furthermore, all three states aim to sustain their nuclear status for the foreseeable future, with an emphasis on versatile forces appropriate for tactical and strategic uses.
Britain has withdrawn its tactical nuclear bombs but now fields the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in both strategic and sub-strategic (that is, tactical) modes, with the latter involving a much smaller warhead yield while retaining full-range capabilities. Total warhead numbers are under 200.
France has withdrawn land-based tactical and theatre missiles but maintains aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons and is modernising its SLBM fleet with the deployment of the Triomphant-class boats, two of which are in service with two more under construction. It maintains a warhead total of about 350.
China has diverse nuclear forces totalling about 400 warheads, primarily configured for regional purposes but with a small intercontinental capability. This last component would be capable of rapid enlargement and enhancement should the United States develop a comprehensive national missile defence system, and there are indications that the future Chinese nuclear posture may move in this direction, although with some reluctance on grounds of cost.
Israel is a country that is often quietly forgotten when nuclear weapons are discussed. It first developed these in the 1960s with French help, and had a limited capability by the time of the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war of October 1973. It has since built up substantial nuclear forces including aircraft-delivered free-fall bombs and up to 100 warheads carried by variants of the Jericho land-based ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,800 kilometres. The total arsenal is likely to by around 200 warheads, including fusion (H-bomb) weapons. Israel may also have tactical artillery shells and may be developing a warhead for use on a submarine-launched cruise missile.
India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 but developed a nuclear arsenal more recently and may have tested fusion as well as fission devices. Its warhead inventory may be slightly smaller than that of Pakistan but is currently being expanded. India has a mix of aircraft and missile delivery systems, including the 2,000-km range Agni II missile, first tested in January 2001.
Pakistan has short- and medium-range aircraft and missile delivery systems for a small but developing nuclear arsenal based on enriched uranium implosion devices. The number of its warheads is difficult to estimate but is likely to be less then fifty.
From Tehran, the world looks different
Beyond these eight established nuclear powers, the capabilities and intentions of two of the three states characterised as part of an axis of evil by President Bush present a complex picture.
North Korea is believed to have produced a very limited number of nuclear warheads - perhaps only two and of low yield - from supplies of reprocessed plutonium; it may also have a limited capability for uranium enrichment to weapons-grade levels. Its leadership is intensely secretive and has something of a fortress mentality, but it is certainly reasonable now to conclude that North Korea has become the worlds ninth nuclear weapons state.
In Iran, there is certainly the potential to develop nuclear weapons, though their production and deployment may still be several years away.
The aggressive assessments of US intelligence sources tend to make sound judgments about Iran difficult, and the Iranian political and power system is hugely more complex than that of North Korea.
But one key aspect is a perception from Tehran that the attitude of the US and other western nuclear states is frankly hypocritical. Iran sees itself as a major and historic state of the region facing a heavily-armed United States which now has forces to its east (Afghanistan), west (Iraq) and south (the Gulf). Its leaderships sense of vulnerability is increased by the fact that Israel shares the USs hardline sentiments towards it. Indeed, Israel has made veiled threats of action against Iran if the United States itself refrains from military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, whether or not the latters purpose is energy supply alone.
Iran also sees Britain and France content to pursue their own nuclear ambitions while ignoring the powerful Israeli nuclear forces, and having little to say about those of India and Pakistan. The end result of this is a degree of cynicism even among the more moderate opinion-formers in Iran; and a reinforced determination among conservative elements that Iranians must unite in the face of a stated threat from the United States and Israel.
Any room for countries like Britain and France to ameliorate the excesses of Washingtons war on the axis of evil is limited by their own nuclear status and what is widely seen across the Middle East as a two-faced attitude. The tensions inherent in this situation would be eased substantially if these countries were more clearly willing to embrace multilateral progress towards nuclear disarmament as covered by the non-proliferation treaty.
In the absence of such a move, there is a persistent perception in the Middle East that these two countries also operate according to a principle of do as I say, not as I do. This perception really does limit the ability of Britain, for example, to have much impact on Iranian policy. For the moment, there is not much prospect of change, but it is worth noting that one effect of the US tendency towards pre-emption may have been to propel North Korea down the very nuclear weapons path that it sought to avoid.
Even though Iranian society and power politics are more complex than North Korean, a similar effect is possible there. This would make some form of military action by the United States or Israel against Iran an increasingly likely prospect. The dangerous consequences of such an outcome could greatly exceed even those now being experienced in Iraq.
