The deteriorating security situation in Iraq has attracted most of the attention of policy-makers and analysts in recent weeks. But the status of al-Qaida and its affiliates has remained a consistent background issue, not least because of a number of warnings from US sources about the possibility of further paramilitary actions in the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia. Now, within only a few days, three events the bombing of a compound in Riyadh, a warning of London being at risk of attack, and a substantial US military operation in Afghanistan have propelled al-Qaida again to the forefront of the war on terror.
The Riyadh attack
The most visible of these events was the bombing of the Muhaya residential compound west of Riyadh, just after midnight on 9 November. A large car bomb destroyed ten villas and damaged scores more, killing 17 people and injuring over 100. Unlike the more costly bombings in May, this was aimed less at western expatriates from western countries than at the wider range of service workers from the Middle East and south Asia who are so important to the Saudi economy.
Some analysts, pointing to the high levels of security employed at residential estates housing westerners, suggest that an attack like this on a relatively soft target is an indication that al-Qaida and other paramilitary groups are in decline. It is certainly the case that the Saudi security forces had been very active before this attack. Six days earlier, Saudi police had killed two suspects and captured six in an operation in Mecca; the following day two suspects killed themselves, apparently rather than face arrest and interrogation, and the police shot dead another suspect.
These actions are part of a much wider campaign of assaults on suspected militants. The lack of reliable information makes the progress of this strategy difficult to measure. According to some sources, for example, a number of Saudi police actions in recent weeks have been less than successful, with many of the suspects escaping into hiding.
It is possible that the Muhaya bomb was indeed an immediate response to security activities, in order to demonstrate that paramilitary groups remained highly active. Furthermore, while the residential compound itself may not have been as heavily protected as others, it was close to a number of palaces owned by some of Saudi Arabias princely families.
Al-Qaida itself still has two short-term aims eviction of foreign forces from the region and the destruction of the House of Saud, regarded by the networks supporters as corrupt and venal, and entirely unacceptable as Keeper of the Two Holy Places. Detonating a large explosive device close to palaces of the Royal Family would therefore be an appropriate reminder of al-Qaidas power and purpose, even if its short-term effect may have been to damage support for al-Qaida in the Kingdom.
The London warning
The second recent event that refocused attention on al-Qaida is the 11 November publication of its annual risk map by the international security consultancy, Control Risks. This showed an upgrading in the assessment of the risk of an attack on London. While the United States, Canada, most of western Europe and much of the rest of Britain was characterised at low risk, London joined the medium risk category along with states like Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Bahrain.
The reasoning behind the Control Risks assessment was that in the last year Britain has reinforced its position in the eyes of the Islamic world as the major ally of the US. As a result, says Control Risks research director, Jake Stratton, London has become the pre-eminent terrorist target in Western Europe .
It might be argued that an organisation such as Control Risks, with an income derived mainly from providing security advice and support for private business, is likely to foster a sense of threat for its own purposes. There may be something in this, but Control Risks also seeks a trustworthy long-term reputation for informed analysis; nor is the organisation saying anything more than has been leaked from some British government security sources. In any case, the key points Control Risks is making about Londons relative vulnerability to attack, and the link between this threat assessment and Britains status as a close US ally, especially in Iraq are uncontroversial.
The Taliban resurgence
The third recent event is news of a major new United States offensive in Afghanistan, itself a reminder that the US is continuing to fight a war on two fronts. In the past six months there has been a resurgence of Taliban activity in Afghanistan and renewed support for the Taliban in several parts of Pakistan. This combination means that effective control of a number of Afghan provinces has slipped away from warlords or provincial governors. Such control was never properly in the hands of the Hamid Karzai administration, a situation that is unlikely to change given the slow pace of development of either the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or a national Afghan army.
The result is that Taliban elements now have substantial control over small but significant parts of Afghanistan, are able to move freely between these areas and Pakistan, and are in a position from which they can spread their influence.
To address this security threat, the United States maintains over 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. On 8 November, American forces launched Operation Mountain Resolve, a major military offensive in Nuristan and Kunar provinces by members of the 10th Mountain Division. Troops were airlifted into several areas with the aim of denying the use of shelter and other facilities to Taliban militia.
The extent of Taliban influence in Afghanistan makes it unlikely that the current US operation will cause its forces great damage. The real significance of such a large operation is that it is being conducted nearly two years after the fall of the Taliban regime, long after US combat troops were confidently expected to have been able to leave the country.
The al-Qaida condition
The lack of western control of parts of Afghanistan, and the support for the Taliban in Pakistan, both relate to a wider question: the status and prospects of al-Qaida in the region and across the Islamic world.
In a broad perspective, al-Qaida and its associates have remained highly active over the past two years, as attacks in Karachi, Djakarta, Bali, Casablanca, Tunisia, Kuwait, Yemen, Mombasa and Riyadh demonstrate. This activity continues witness repeated warnings from western security agencies, the new bombing in Riyadh and apparent activity in Iraq.
This level of activity seems on the surface hard to explain alongside the termination of the Taliban regime, and claims from Washington in particular that al-Qaida has been substantially weakened and dispersed, with much of its leadership killed or captured.
A recent analysis by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies [(IISS), The Military Balance, 2003-2004] suggests that these claims are inflated. The IISS assessment confirms the view that President Bushs war on terror has attacked al-Qaida with vigour, but also with problematic results: In numerous jurisdictions, according to US officials, over 3,000 suspected al-Qaeda operatives have been arrested, including several key players such as third-in-command Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. But the counter-terrorism effort has also perversely impelled an already highly decentralised and evasive transnational terrorist network to become more virtual and protean and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralise.
The central point here bears emphasis: al-Qaida is not and never was a strictly hierarchical organisation, but much more of a network of like-minded groups working in different parts of the world involving some loose coordination, a certain focus on Osama bin Laden and the militants around him, and a degree of centralised training facilities in Afghanistan. Such an entity has been able not only to adapt and evolve in the face of actions by the US and other states, but also to attract a steady stream of new recruits and the assumption of power by new leaders.
The field of activity of the network stretches across numerous countries in the Middle East in which anti-American attitudes have hardened in the past two years, as a result of the very nature of the Bush administration but more specifically its actions in Iraq and the continuing confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians. Al-Qaida and its affiliates, in short, remain very much in being, and capable of operations in many parts of the world.
The Iraqi theatre
There remains one area to be explored in the assessment of al-Qaidas condition how far its militants and associates are involved in operations in Iraq, where the situation has become sufficiently tense for Paul Bremer to return to Washington for urgent consultations. Vice-President Dick Cheney and others have repeatedly claimed that Iraq has become a focus for al-Qaida and that Iraq is a key theatre of the war on terror. In apparent confirmation of this view, up to twenty al-Qaida suspects have been arrested in Iraq this week.
Until recently, there appeared to be a conflict between the views expressed by the US military leadership in Baghdad that al-Qaida was indeed a significant presence, and the opinions of district commanders that this was not the case. Now, there is agreement that al-Qaida has not yet become notably large; the US commander, Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez states that the number of foreign paramilitaries in Iraq is probably no more than 200.
Even if correct, this judgment is not inconsistent with the strong view held by some observers that such a presence is now beginning to develop in Iraq, one that is still in the very early stages of development but which could broaden in scale.
In sum, the current picture is one of a trans-national paramilitary organisation, centred on al-Qaida but with many affiliates, that remains active and capable of attacks in a number of countries. Al-Qaida has not been defeated and the security situation in Iraq is deteriorating. In such circumstances, this weeks sudden recall of Paul Bremer to Washington is hardly surprising.
