For a very short period in mid-January, some in the United States military were optimistic that the insurgency in Iraq was in retreat. The feeling was shattered by the truck-bombing at the entrance to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad, itself the prelude to a sustained period of attacks on US troops and Iraqi public servants, especially the police.
This pattern has continued for a second week and has involved a diverse range of attacks carrying a great cost in human life. The assaults on US troops have included a rocket fired at a logistics support base for the 4th infantry division in Balad, 80 kilometres (50 miles) south of Tikrit, killing one soldier and injuring twelve more; and a roadside bomb south of Kirkuk killing three more soldiers.
A Kurdish tragedy
In a surprise incident on Friday 30 January, the Dutch embassy in Baghdad was set on fire by a rocket-propelled grenade. The four Dutch diplomats normally resident were not present, and were later relocated to a US military base for their own safety; but the purpose of the attack was clearly to deter the Dutch government from further involvement in Iraq.
The Netherlands currently has a marine battalion operating with the CPA in Iraq. This is shortly to be replaced by an airmobile infantry battalion from the Dutch army, supported by four Chinook helicopters. The Dutch armed forces have been developing new forms of rapid deployment in recent years, and the armys presence in Iraq is to involve part of the new 11 Air Manoeuvre Brigade (International Defence Review, February 2004). In this context, the embassy attack was a reminder that the insurgent forces are aware of the nature and extent of the involvement of states such as the Netherlands in what they see as the foreign occupation of the country.
Paul Rogerss new book, a collection of his openDemocracy weekly columns, is now available. A war on terror: Afghanistan and after is published by Pluto Press
As has frequently been the case, Iraqi security forces and political parties have taken the brunt of recent violence. On 31 January, a car-bomb suicide attack on a police station in Mosul killed nine people and wounded 45; later the same day, a residential district of Baghdad was attacked twice by mortars and rockets, killing six people.
The most devastating incident came on Sunday 1 February, when two suicide bombers wearing explosives hidden in their clothes made coordinated assaults on the offices of the two main Kurdish political parties in Irbil. One was a woman, the other a man dressed as a cleric, both wore flowing robes and neither was searched.
The dead, among a large gathering at the offices, included significant leaders of both parties. Among the 101 people killed were the deputy head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the mayor of Irbil and his deputy and the citys chief of police.
The number of Americans killed by hostile action in January (37 soldiers and one civilian) exceeded that in December (24 soldiers).
No time to rethink
In the Afghan theatre, recent incidents include the deaths of a British and a Canadian soldier in Kabul and the loss of seven US soldiers in an explosion at an arms dump that is still being investigated. The deaths of ten civilians in a US air attack on a village in Oruzgan province on 17 January have raised further tensions. US military sources said initially that Taliban militia had been killed, but Hamid Karzais government later contradicted this by saying that it had been yet another friendly fire incident.
These signals of insecurity and violence in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest, at the very least, questions over the progress of the war on terror. And as if these two countries were not enough, the Bush administration also has to worry about Pakistan in particular, a continuing al-Qaida and Taliban presence in provinces bordering Afghanistan and the risk of assassination shadowing President Pervez Musharraf.
All this might suggest the need for a thorough reassessment of US military strategy especially since it anticipated only around half the present numbers now in Iraq being required, and an even smaller proportion in Afghanistan. Recent columns in this series have indicated that elements of the US military are indeed reviewing current options; but at least for the present, the traditional military approach is being reinforced.
Last weeks column reported the Pentagons reluctance, against pressure from Congress, to increase the size of the US armed forces. It now appears that the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, has had to order a temporary increase in the size of the US army by 30,000 troops because of the current strains imposed by operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere (Bradley Graham, 30,000 More Soldiers Approved by Rumsfeld, Washington Post, 29 January 2004).
This move takes place in the context of further increases in the US defence budget. President Bush is asking Congress for $401.7 billion for fiscal year 2005, a 7% increase on the current year; but there will also be further major requests, after the November 2004 presidential election, for money to support continuing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. These may run to $50 billion or more, a figure substantially higher than Britains entire defence budget. On present trends, US defence spending could hit $0.5 trillion a year within two years.
The armys chief of staff, General Peter Schoomaker, revealed some of the immediate problems facing the Pentagon in Iraq in recent evidence given to the House Armed Services Committee. The US currently has well over 100,000 troops in Iraq and is in the process of replacing them with a similar number. Schoomaker disclosed that he has ordered his staff to plan for a similar rotation in 2005 and yet another in 2006.
While this process is still in the planning stage, it means that the army is preparing for the possibility of maintaining a very large occupying force in Iraq for at least three years far longer than almost anyone had envisaged and an indication that the US is now facing serious long-term problems.
This assessment is supported by an unexpectedly harsh prognosis of security trends by the head of US Central Command, General John Abizaid, in Washington late last week. Abizaid in marked contrast to some of the local US commanders believes that the insurgency in Iraq is set to increase. But his most surprising comments relate to the overall progress of Bushs war on terror and his view that concluding the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan is not the greatest military challenge: The two broader strategic problems that we have to deal with happen to be Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Abizaid here is acknowledging two key assets al-Qaida and its associates still possess: significant support within Saudi Arabia, and continuing freedom of movement in parts of Pakistan. The resurgence of Taliban activity across the border in Afghanistan is fuelling US military plans for a major spring offensive that could extend to military action in Pakistan too.
The arc of war widens
If approved, this plan would, according to the Chicago Tribune (28 January 2004), involve US intelligence officers in Pakistan preparing a coordinated military operation involving army rangers, special operations forces and other ground troops supported by air power coming partly from an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea.
Such an extension of the war would be highly controversial within Pakistan. It comes at a time of real US concern over the survival of President Musharraf and his government. It is also part of a wider policy of the Pentagon to expand its force projection.
In recent weeks, US forces in Iraq close to the Syrian border have been increased. A number of instances have occurred of special forces operating in Syrian territory and of US planes penetrating Syrian air space. In one case, reports Janes Intelligence Digest (23 January 2004), Iraqi insurgents were pursued across the border in an operation that killed more than twenty people, including some Syrians.
There are indications that Donald Rumsfeld may be planning to order attacks on paramilitary bases in Somalia and the Bekaa valley in Lebanon. The former would entail an escalation of current special forces actions in Somalia, but extending the war on terror to Lebanon would involve even closer collaboration with Israel and raise the prospect of a direct confrontation with the Syrian army that still occupies parts of the country.
Such an operation may seem unlikely, not least because of its regional consequences, but it would be unwise to underestimate the commitment of people like Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz to a vigorous pursuit of their war.
In this light, and given the nature of the Bush administration, the option of rethinking the very nature of the war is simply not possible. Instead, reversals require an even stronger commitment of force. It is quite possible that US military action will spread to further countries in the coming months.
