A draft constitution for Iraq was belatedly approved on 8 March 2004 by the US-appointed Interim Governing Council (IGC), after last-minute disputes involving both Kurdish and Shia representatives. Although the IGC is not a fully representative body, its decision will help the United States as it seeks to extricate itself by the end of June from being legally responsible for control of the country.
The proposed transfer of sovereignty does not in any way mean that the US will reduce its forces in Iraq. As discussed in earlier columns in this series, the Pentagon is already planning for the possible maintenance of a force of around 100,000 troops for up to three years. There are, separately, developments now underway to establish a number of permanent US military bases in the country. An American military presence of at least 10,000 for the next decade or more can be expected.
Paul Rogerss new book, a collection of his openDemocracy weekly columns, is now available. A war on terror: Afghanistan and after is published by Pluto Press
Perhaps more revealing as an indicator of the US requirement to maintain influence in Iraq is the rapid development of plans to establish a large-scale diplomatic presence centred on what is likely to be the largest embassy maintained by any country anywhere in the world (see Robin Wright, U.S. Rushes to Prepare Embassy in Iraq, Washington Post, 9 March 2004).
If the 30 June deadline for handing over nominal power to a caretaker Iraqi government goes ahead, then responsibility for Iraq will move from the Pentagon, which controls the Coalition Provisional Authority, to the state department. In Baghdad itself, this will be reflected in an embassy staffed by up to 4,000 people that will include the US military command and a civilian administration responsible for a reconstruction budget that will be three times as large as the US foreign aid budget to all other countries.
Yet the security problems in Iraq mean that there are no immediate plans to construct a new embassy building. Instead, Saddam Husseins palace within the heavily protected green zone in the centre of Baghdad will serve as the embassy for the foreseeable future, notwithstanding the symbolic associations of this becoming the centre of US power in the country.
The numbers of diplomats needed in Iraq require staff to be transferred from other countries. At the same time, the US armed forces are redeploying some of their special forces from Iraq and into Afghanistan and (probably) Pakistan.
The Pakistan-Afghanistan theatre
A theme of recent columns in this series has been the assessment that the US military is planning a major push in south-west Asia in the coming spring and early summer (see the columns of 5 February and 26 February 2004). Persistent news reports reinforce this analysis, and it now appears probable that substantial operations on both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border are already underway and will be increased and sustained over the next three months or more.
There are two motivations on the American side. First, the strategic one of addressing the continuing instability and violence in Afghanistan, and countering the prospect of a Taliban guerrilla resurgence in the coming months. In autumn 2003 there were frequent Taliban-organised incidents, including attacks on international and Afghan aid workers. These actions decreased somewhat during the winter months, a trend that may be attributable to the military preparations for 2004 being made by Taliban and other insurgent groups.
Paul Rogers will speak at a conference on Missile Defence Threats, Responses and Projections in Bradford, England on 18 March 2004. The conference is hosted by British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and Bradford Universitys Department of Peace Studies. For more information, click here
Recent events, such as the killing of five aid workers in the past three weeks, seem to confirm this judgment. Most recently, the director of the Afghan Red Crescent in the southern province of Zabul, Mohammed Isha, was shot dead on 6 March; this came the day after a Turkish road engineer and an Afghan guard were killed in the same region, and another Turkish engineer and a guard abducted.
The second US motivation is the killing or detention of members of the Taliban and al-Qaida leadership, especially Osama bin Laden himself. US military activity within Afghanistan to this end has increased recently. On 6 March, two operations involving US and Afghan forces resulted in nine insurgents being killed and another fourteen detained.
The US also maintains two major bases in Afghanistan, at Bagram near Kabul and an isolated base in the vicinity of Kandahar. Intense activity at both bases suggests that major ground operations are imminent, and that these will coincide with direct action by the Pakistani army in the so-called tribal areas and in North-West Frontier Province.
Indeed, the developments across the border in Pakistan are even more significant than those in Afghanistan. The United States has been curiously muted in responding to the exposure of the remarkable nuclear smuggling activities of Abdul Qadeer Khan; this may be connected with its overall need to support Pakistans leader, Pervez Musharraf, allied to a specific requirement for collaborative action from the countrys army.
In addition, there are reliable reports of an increase in US armed operations in Pakistan itself, extending far beyond cross-border operations. Two air bases in Pakistan have been the focus for extensive movements designed to provide logistical support for special forces and intelligence groups. One is Dalbandin air base in the western region of Baluchistan, but it is the sprawling Shahbaz air base near Jacobabad that appears to be the key to the USs forthcoming spring offensive.
At Jacobabad, C-17 transport aircraft are reported to be involved in daily deliveries of supplies for special forces units that then disperse to areas in Pakistan adjacent to the Afghan border. According to the Pakistan newspaper the Daily Times (10 March 2004), the airbase is currently under US control with an inner ring of facilities off-limits to the Pakistani military.
The Pakistani army is already fulfilling its side of the bargain. In the past two weeks it has conducted large-scale cordon-and-search operations (see Scott Baldauf, New thrust in hunt for bin Laden, Christian Science Monitor 4 March 2004). These have included disastrous consequences; ten days ago, Pakistani troops opened fire on a minibus at a checkpoint near Wana, killing fourteen civilians and causing a bitter domestic political reaction.
The problem for General Musharrafs government is that the army has traditionally treated the north-western parts of the country as quasi-independent, and has put little effort into securing control of them. But in current circumstances the US is strongly determined to expand the war on terror precisely to these areas in the hope of damaging Taliban and al-Qaida capabilities. The Pakistani leader is aware that if his own armed forces do not play their part, the United States is prepared to pressurise Musharraf to allow it to undertake the operations itself.
This increases the delicacy of Musharrafs present situation. If the Pakistani army does engage in the extensive operations that the United States requires, the likely result is more vigorous opposition to his government that might activate elements within the Pakistani security establishment which are sympathetic to the Taliban and al-Qaida. But if the army resists being conscripted into this role, there could be even more anti-Musharraf violence in reaction to heavy US military involvement in Pakistan.
All the indications are that the United States, despite potential pitfalls, is determined to proceed with its new offensive. Washington needs results, not least because of the forthcoming presidential election, and this outweighs concerns about the stability of the Musharraf government. The condition of Iraq will continue to be a focus of US concern as the June handover of sovereignty approaches, but Afghanistan/Pakistan may be pivotal to the next phase in the war on terror.
