The predicament facing United States forces in Iraq is currently made even more severe by two apparently separate developments – the apparently systemic abuse of Iraqi prisoners, and Israel’s forceful policy of assaults and house-demolitions in the Gaza strip.
The first development reflects evidence now surfacing that much of the treatment of detainees in Iraqi prisons stems directly from a well-established policy originating shortly after the 9/11 attacks and operating initially in Afghanistan. Such was the determination of the Bush administration to pursue al-Qaida and its associates, that it turned a blind eye to the Geneva Conventions, and began to use techniques of interrogation and persuasion reminiscent of Latin America and elsewhere at the height of the cold war.
Much of the new information has been revealed by Seymour Hersh, a journalist with a strong record of investigative accuracy (“The Gray Zone”, New Yorker, 15 May 2004). Abu Ghraib, says Hersh, is the natural consequence of importing Afghanistan-style interrogation tactics into Iraq in 2003, when the insurgency was beginning to spread beyond control and intelligence was desperately needed.
The Pentagon has denied Seymour Hersh’s allegation that it attempted to cover up the abuse. Whether Hersh has got it completely right is not yet clear, but there is already considerable evidence to support what he writes. In particular, his claim that the Abu Ghraib tactics are part of a widespread pattern is consistent with repeated statements from former detainees – even though US generals appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 19 May blamed a breakdown in the chain of command. Moreover, other US military sources now confirm that the methods applied were not restricted to a handful of soldiers; a former Abu Ghraib intelligence officer, Sergeant Samuel Provence, says that “dozens” were involved (“Definitely a Cover-Up”, ABC News, 18 May 2004).
openDemocracy writers respond to and analyse the torture of Iraqis at Abu Ghraib – see the articles by Isabel Hilton, Maï Ghoussoub, and Laila Kazmi
Perhaps most revealing is the leaking of a January 2002 memorandum from White House counsel Alberto Gonzales. This recommended that President Bush publicly declare the war in Afghanistan and against al-Qaida be exempt from the Geneva Conventions on the grounds that if this was not done there would be a risk of future war crimes prosecutions (Michael Isikoff, “Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings”, Newsweek, 19 May 2004). Bush did not make this declaration.
What is becoming more apparent is that the ill-treatment of detainees in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere has been persistent and extensive. For people across the Middle East this is nothing new. What is different is that digital cameras and the internet have conspired to make it accessible to a global public in a quite unexpected manner.
The Gaza factor
The second development is the current policy of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in Gaza. After experiencing unexpected and serious casualties during recent operations in Gaza’s refugee camps, the Ariel Sharon government’s use of significant military force, including the destruction of hundreds of houses, has caused scores of Palestinian deaths. Israel justifies this on the basis of its security needs, but the reporting of its actions worldwide, and Washington’s failure to put pressure on Sharon to desist, are together responsible for the settled view across the Middle East that this is yet another example of an American-Israeli axis.
Eoin Murray writes from Gaza about Israel’s assault on Rafah in openDemocracy’s forums
Moreover, there is a near-total belief in the region that the present Israeli government has no interest whatsoever in the creation of a viable Palestinian state – rather, that it seeks to ensure that Gaza, even after any evacuation of Jewish settlements, remains a territory completely controlled by Israel. The northern and eastern borders will comprise impenetrable barriers with fully-controlled crossing-points; the southern border with Egypt will have Israeli controls on its northern margin, hence the recent demolition of houses close to the border; the Mediterranean coast will be comprehensively patrolled; and there will be no access by air.
Shlomo Ben-Ami offers an original perspective on Ariel Sharon’s Gaza plan and what the Palestinians can do; see “Sharon’s Gaza disengagement: roadmap to a Palestinian state?” (April 2004)
In parallel with this, a truncated West Bank will be fenced off, allowing its Palestinian inhabitants minimal access to Israel and Jordan; numerous strategic roads, roadblocks and key settlements will control movement between towns and cities. In the view of most Arabs, “Palestine” will resemble a series of huge open prisons with the most minimal autonomy and under the long-term domination of Israel.
This may not be the intention across the whole of Israeli society, it may even be more perception than reality, but the policies and actions of Ariel Sharon’s government make the Arab view highly plausible. In addition Sharon’s policies are widely seen to have the tacit support of the Bush administration and come at a time of ever-closer links between the Israeli and American armed forces.
A striking indication of this is the emergency refitting of the US Bradley fighting vehicles in Iraq with Israeli “add-on” armour. In spite of their existing defences, the Bradleys have proved vulnerable to powerful roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades, with more than 150 US soldiers killed over the past year. The Israeli arms company Rafael has developed a form of reactive armour for Israel’s own armoured vehicles that is effective in countering such weapons, and is now working with a US partner, General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products (GDATP) to provide emergency supplies to the US army in Iraq. 140 sets of armour are currently being produced under two contracts worth $40 million.
A project under strain
The treatment of Iraqi detainees and Israel’s actions against the Palestinians, then, further inflame the anti-American mood in the Middle East. Both are occurring in the context of a deterioration in the security situation in Iraq. The assassination of the Iraqi Governing Council’s president, Izzedin Salim, in particular, appears to have crystallised opposition to US policies across a broad swathe of Iraqi opinion, much of it normally pro-American.
This stems, in part, from Salim’s long-standing record of opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime and also to the obvious fact that the US forces are unable to protect even the most senior members of the Iraqi political establishment. Even more seriously, though, the murder is seen as an example of the deeply entrenched problem of general insecurity, expressed this week by a normally pro-American Kurdish member of the IGC, Mahmoud Othman: “If something is not done about this security situation, there will be no transfer of power. Never in Iraq has it been like this – never, even under Saddam…People are killed, kidnapped and assaulted; children are taken away; women are raped. Nobody is afraid of any punishment.”
There are at present remarkably conflicting reports of US plans for the near-term future, a state of affairs that may indicate deep indecision at a moment of evident crisis. After the meeting of coalition foreign ministers on 14 May, both Colin Powell and Jack Straw raised the possibility of a withdrawal from Iraq if a new Iraqi authority demanded it. In the light of Tony Blair’s and George W. Bush’s commitment to “see things through”, this seemed to be a significant change of policy.
What is even more significant, though, is that statements about a possible withdrawal appear not to have any connection with current military planning. The US military may well be withdrawing from most Iraqi urban areas into heavily-fortified army camps and air bases, but it shows no indication whatsoever either of reducing the size of its occupying forces or of any weakening in its determination to maintain permanent bases.
Instead, current planning involves keeping as many as 135,000 troops in Iraq for the foreseeable future, a large increase on earlier plans for just over 100,000. These enhanced levels will be achieved by extending the tours of duty of 20,000 troops from the 1st armoured division and the 2nd armoured cavalry regiment by at least three months. These in turn will be replaced by fresh troops not included in the original troop rotation plans.
In the longer term, one-year tours of duty in Iraq are likely to become standard, and the Pentagon is calling up about 37,000 National Guard and reserve troops to active service this year. This will take the number of National Guard and reserve forces on active service to 226,000, an increase of 19.5%. This alone is more than twice the size of the entire British army, and gives some indication of the strains now being felt by the US military (see an earlier column in this series, “The American military: all stressed out”, 8 April 2004 ).
Perhaps the most symbolically important development of all is the decision to start moving American troops from South Korea to Iraq. The numbers will initially be small - no more than a brigade of about 3,600 troops from the 2nd infantry division. But they represent the first significant cut in the US military presence in South Korea for over a decade.
The decision, against the background of an unresolved crisis over North Korea - another key component in George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” - indicates the degree of overstretch now facing the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. It comes in advance of the further deterioration in security in Iraq that is widely expected in the summer. It is no surprise that a gathering mood in Washington senses that the occupation of Iraq is now verging on failure.
