The intelligence of al–Qaida

Iraq’s political transition to self–governing status on 30 June is taking place amidst a relentless military insurgency. A number of fascinating and little–noticed trends are underway in the country, but even more significant long–term developments in the “war on terror” may be taking place in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Iraq: a wind of change

In Iraq, operations against the United States military continue at the rate of forty a day, and bombings and assassination of Iraqi officials also show no sign of easing. There have also been recurrent attacks on the oil distribution system. Here, a pattern is beginning to emerge. It appears that the insurgents sabotage one or more major pipelines and then hold fire while these are being repaired. As soon as the repairs are completed, they mount another major assault, most likely in another part of the system far removed from the original target. Thus the pipelines in southern Iraq that were bombed last week were just about ready for use again on 21 June but there were new attacks in northern Iraq within twenty–four hours.

Paul Rogers’s new book, a collection of his openDemocracy weekly columns, is A war on terror: Afghanistan and after (Pluto Press); his monthly briefings for the Oxford Research Group (May 2003–April 2004) are collected in the organisation’s international security report for 2004, Iraq and the War on Terror

Three other factors in Iraq are relevant as 30 June approaches. First, the incoming administration headed by Iyad Allawi is already considering plans to introduce a state of emergency as part of an effort to control the insurgency, including curfews and bans on political demonstrations.

Second, a subtle but politically important change in US military policy in Iraq is occurring, involving a much lower profile for its troops after the handover of sovereignty. It is true that over 130,000 US troops will remain in the country under full US military control – including the ability to act independently of the Allawi administration. Indeed, the controversial US bombing raid on a house in Fallujah on 19 June, reported to have killed members of an extended family, was done without Iyad Allawi’s knowledge.

Yet although US forces will retain ultimate control of security in Iraq, their intention is greatly to limit their patrols from 1 July, to stay out of sight and to give the impression that security is in the hands of Iraqi police and civil defence units (see Bradley Graham, “US Forces Plan Lower Profile”, Washington Post, 21 June 2004). In the short term this could reduce US casualties, but there are numerous indications that Iraqi security forces are inadequately trained, poorly armed and equipped and in many cases not motivated to fight against fellow Iraqis. If this turns out to be a general trend and if the insurgency grows, then US attempts to avoid contact with the local population may prove short–lived.

Third, the increasing involvement of Israel in Kurdish areas (see Seymour Hersh’s “Plan B”, New Yorker, 21 June 2004) is significant. Although information is still sparse, there is mounting evidence of Israeli special force involvement in the training of Kurdish troops in north–east Iraq, a role that stems in part from Israel’s desire to develop a long–term presence in the region.

Israeli intelligence agencies regard the US occupation of Iraq as near–disastrous, leaving it no easy exit strategy. They expect a long period of disorder, where the Kurds maintain a degree of security in their own area and attempt to distance themselves from the rest of Iraq, but are still troubled by the attitude of surrounding countries – especially Turkey with its substantial Kurdish minority.

In such circumstances, Israeli military aid is welcomed by some Kurds and it has the great advantage to Israel of increasing its influence in an area very close to the country it sees as its real enemy – Iran. Many Israeli strategists believe that Iran is intent on developing nuclear weapons and are they are simply not convinced that the United States will take pre–emptive military action to prevent this happening, particularly if George W. Bush loses the November 2004 election.

A nuclear–armed Iran is simply not acceptable to the Israeli government and if the United States will not act to prevent this, then Israel is likely to do so. Its problem is that Iranian nuclear facilities are so far away from Israel that its strike aircraft would have real difficulty in attacking them; unless, of course, intermediate bases could be used in the Kurdish area of Iraq.

Such action may be many months or even years away, but it is certainly on the Israeli military agenda and does much to explain the support currently being offered to the Iraqi Kurds.

Pakistan: a double–edged alliance

Meanwhile, events have moved rapidly in western areas of Pakistan. As reported in earlier columns in this series [see “Into the Afghan fire” (11 March 2004) and “A war of shadows” (18 March 2004)], the United States military have put General Pervez Musharraf’s government under considerable pressure for several months to undertake joint operations against Taliban and other militias on its side of the border with Afghanistan . Such attempts in March–April 2004 achieved virtually nothing, but the Pakistani army followed them with major raids in early June.

An immediate response was an assassination attempt against the commander of the army’s V Corps in Karachi, Lieutenant–General Hayat. This killed ten people in the general’s convoy; a number of suspects were later arrested. More importantly for the Pakistanis, army units killed one of the most important Taliban commanders, the 26–year old Nek Mohammed. He had been an experienced and, to many followers, charismatic leader responsible for much of the opposition to earlier Pakistan army raids in the frontier district of South Waziristan.

This arrest would normally be considered welcome news for Musharraf and the United States, but two factors suggest otherwise. First, there are already indications that Nek Mohammed’s death will reinforce opposition to both parties; the quick announcement of his successor as leader, Mohammed Umer, is an indication of this.

Second, there are persistent reports that the bombing raid that killed Nek Mohammed was actually carried out by US military (or possibly CIA) personnel operating from a Pakistan army camp at Zeria Noor, South Waziristan. If this proves to be the case, the end result may be to increase antagonism to Musharraf and his apparent willingness to work so closely with the United States.

Saudi Arabia: the noose tightens

The United States could equally claim an indirect success in Saudi Arabia, with the killing on 18 June of its al–Qaida commander, Abd al–Aziz al–Muqrin. Al–Muqrin, reported to have been centrally involved in recent attacks on western expatriates, died in an exchange of fire with Saudi security forces.

Again, however, an internet source linked to al–Qaida announced al–Muqrin’s successor soon afterwards. He is Salih al–Oufi, former member of the Saudi security forces and a highly experienced paramilitary who spent time in Afghanistan and was injured while fighting in Chechnya.

This swift declaration may be a device by al–Qaida planners to show the robustness and resilience of their organisation – or it may simply be that they are now routinely efficient. In any case, Saudi Arabia is moving to the heart of al–Qaida strategy after a period in which its focus has been more on Central Asia.

The historically core al–Qaida aims are the removal of US troops from Saudi Arabia and the destruction of the Royal House of Saud as an illegitimate Keeper of the Two Holy Places. But Saudi Arabia is a prize target not only because it is the birthplace of Islam, but because of its massive oil reserves. Control of the country that holds over a quarter of the world’s oil would crucially aid al–Qaida’s long–term aim of expanding radical Islamist governance across the Middle East and beyond.

Yet it may be over–simplified to see al–Qaida as simply intending the destruction of the House of Saud. True, the network launches attacks on the Saudi security apparatus, but its primary target there was the American military, and – after the removal of almost all such forces from Saudi Arabia – is now expatriates. The wave of attacks on expatriate residential compounds and offices seeks to effect a mass exodus, but al–Qaida’s calculation is that this would not necessarily entail the collapse of the Saudi oil industry.

More likely is a period of disorganisation and readjustment, during which Saudi personnel substituting for the expatriate specialists would occupy key positions. Al–Qaida hopes and expects that many of its sympathisers would be among them. At present, many people sympathetic to al–Qaida are thought to operate within the Saudi civil service and even in the security forces, perhaps reflecting an al–Qaida strategy to accumulate influence via a progressive but mostly unobtrusive revolution stretching over several years (see James Eldridge, “Saudi Arabia: Al Qaeda’s Strategic Goals”, 18 June 2004).

There is one fundamental reason behind the network’s careful and subtle strategy. Al–Qaida planners are well aware that any openly violent end to the House of Saud, and its replacement by a radical Islamist government controlled by al–Qaida, would be intolerable to the United States. Such an outcome would prompt American military action aimed, at the very least, at securing the rich oilfields close to the Persian Gulf coast. While this would increase support for al–Qaida and lead to a long and bitter conflict, it would also inflict serious damage on the Saudi economy that would take many years to redress – hindering the long–term strategy of the network.

Hence al–Qaida’s current intention of progressively evicting foreign nationals, especially those from North America and western Europe, while seeking to gain greater support and influence within the kingdom. In this context, those of its actions that have resulted in the deaths of Muslims are deeply counterproductive and are thus likely to decrease, whereas attacks on expatriates will continue and probably increase in intensity.

Al–Qaida’s popular support is hugely aided by the US presence in Iraq, where there is some evidence of wider al–Qaida involvement, even if it is still a minor part of the larger insurgency. In this wider context, the death of Abd al–Aziz al–Muqrin is one small incident in a gathering war. Iraq may well deserve the current attention it receives, but Pakistan and – even more – Saudi Arabia remain essential components of al–Qaida’s greater vision.