The Pakistan factor

The past two weeks have seen events in Russia take centre–stage in the “war on terror”. The school siege in Beslan, North Ossetia, ended chaotically with a very heavy loss of life (at least 335 people killed, perhaps more); this followed the bombing of a Moscow metro station and the destruction of two civilian aircraft that together killed nearly 100 people. The death of around 500 people and injuries to hundreds more in these four attacks has left a residue of sorrow, bitterness and anger across Russia.

The spate of incidents is causing serious problems for President Vladimir Putin, although the mood in the country remains broadly hostile to the presumed Chechen perpetrators of the attacks. Putin’s attempts to represent the Chechen insurgency as part of President Bush’s wider war on terror strike a certain chord with some sectors of western political opinion, but only to a point.

Indeed, Putin’s own military approach in Chechnya is proving counterproductive, in its alienation of the civilian population and activation of a newly radicalised and even brutalised generation of insurgents. In such circumstances, the Russian state’s consistent use of force as the primary weapon of its own regional war on terror is beginning to be questioned in terms similar to criticism of President Bush’s global strategy.

The Iraqi trap

In the week of the Beslan siege it was announced that 66 United States troops had been killed in Iraq in August 2004, substantially exceeding earlier estimates. This death toll was accompanied by injuries to 1100 US soldiers and marines, the highest figure since the war began eighteen months ago, and a consequence of the intense urban warfare in Najaf, Kufa, Baghdad and elsewhere.

The pattern was continued on Saturday 4 September, when a rash of attacks across Iraq caused considerable loss of life. In the Latifya area south of Baghdad, three Iraqi police officers were killed and several wounded when a police car was blown up during raids against armed insurgents; this followed a few hours after the suicide bombing of a police academy in the northern city of Kirkuk, killing twenty–two people and injuring twenty.

At Tal Afar, near the northern city of Mosul, intense and prolonged fighting between American forces and insurgents left twelve people dead and sixty wounded. During the combat, a UH–58 helicopter was forced down, injuring both crew. Elsewhere in Iraq, several US soldiers were injured in an incident near Baquba in central Iraq when a Humvee was destroyed just as troops were about to detonate a landmine.

The same day, there were two further attacks on Iraq’s oil infrastructure. A pipeline explosion near Hartha, thirty kilometres from the southern city of Basra, forced technicians to halt a supply that normally carries 15,000 barrels of oil a day from the Nahran Omar oil field to a coastal storage facility on the Faw peninsula. Near Kirkuk, a pipeline carrying refined products was also attacked.

Two days later, on 6 September, seven US marines were killed in a car–bomb attack in Fallujah, a city subject to continued US bombing raids; the death of five more troops in fighting in Baghdad the next day, and two who died in clashes with the Shi’a militia of Muqtada al–Sadr, brought the number of US soldiers and civilian security personnel in Iraq since the start of the war to over 1000.

Pervez Musharraf’s tightrope

These incidents, a stark reminder of the continuing violence in Iraq, come within days of attacks on US facilities in Afghanistan. The current focus of media attention on Russia, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Indonesia (where a bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta on 9 September killed nine people and injured 180) make it especially important to take note of the severe security problems in Afghanistan, which in turn connect in significant ways to developments across the border in Pakistan.

United States military planners have long believed that the ease with which insurgents can travel between Afghanistan and Pakistan is one of the main problems facing them in Afghanistan. In early 2004 the Pakistani government of President Pervez Musharraf deployed troops in the North and South Waziristan border areas, amidst indications that US special forces and reconnaissance units were also involved. Pakistani army units initially found it difficult to isolate insurgents among a population that was largely antagonistic to the Pakistani government.

As some al–Qaida operatives were killed or detained, the government initially claimed a degree of success in these operations. But Pakistani troop losses were considerable, and the retaliation extended to assassination attempts against government officials. More recently, the Musharraf government is facing further problems that may impact on US actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia.

As the Pakistani government more actively pursues some elements associated with al–Qaida, so attacks on politicians and military leaders have increased. President Musharraf himself survived two assassination attempts in December 2003. There were further incidents on 10 June 2004, when a senior army commander, General Hayat, escaped an attack that killed eleven people, including his driver; and on 30 July, when the finance minister (and prime minister–designate) Shaukat Aziz narrowly missed assassination.

In one sense, Pervez Musharraf is trapped: he must tolerate radical militias that can exert pressure in the Kashmir conflict vis–à–vis India, yet such groups may ally themselves (indeed be synonymous) with paramilitaries active in Afghanistan and even Iraq. Thus, Musharraf is under considerable pressure from the United States to take stronger action against these groups.

Two further factors make this tightrope act highly precarious. First, Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan remain porous and there is continuing evidence of foreign paramilitaries moving in and out of the country almost at will, some even training radical elements. Thus, Musharraf’s problems extend beyond matters of internal security.

Second, the anti–American mood in Pakistan affects much of the population and shows no sign of abating. If anything, the continuing coverage of the war in Iraq, especially by satellite news channels, adds to its intensity. In such circumstances, the United States is pressurising the Pakistani government to support the war on terror at the same time as its operations in Iraq undermine Musharraf’s ability to offer such support.

Yet the Pakistani general, Pervez Musharraf, remains a key factor in Washington’s policies in the middle east and Central Asia. Washington continues to regard him as an ally despite criticism of his failure to exert control over the frontier districts near Afghanistan; from the perspective of the Bush administration, he is better than any likely alternative. Meanwhile, he continues to face the risk of assassination or attempted coup attempts, hence the extraordinary levels of security that surround him.

There is, though, a more positive aspect to the current situation in Pakistan. The election in May 2004 of a Congress–led government in place of the BJP–led coalition has led to a further easing of tensions between the two south Asian rivals. President Musharraf would be especially aided by progress over Kashmir; any diplomatic moves that even hint at the possibility of a negotiated settlement would reduce his dependence on militant Kashmir–orientated groups within Pakistan.

The problem is that opposition groups in Pakistan are only too aware of this potential dynamic and understand that the easiest way to forestall such moves would be to act directly against Musharraf. It follows that if he were to be eliminated, it would be a setback not just for Washington but possibly also for a potential Indo–Pakistan peace process. In short, Pakistan remains far more important than is generally recognised.