America’s Iraqi shift: pre–emption or reaction?

In the developing war in Iraq, particular events can have significance out of proportion to their immediate impact. The latest, three–day United States assault on insurgent forces in Samarra may turn out to be an example of this.

In the run–up to the 2 November 2004 presidential election, there was an expectation that US forces in Iraq would maintain a holding strategy in their attempt to contain the insurgency, and then apply much heavier force in the event of the re–election of President Bush (see last week’s column in this series, “What next in Iraq? Follow the oil”).

This approach would in principle avoid any controversies over civilian casualties before the election, yet leave the way open for determined action to deplete if not defeat the insurgency before the planned Iraqi elections by the end of January 2005.

But if this was indeed Washington’s intention, then its recent operation in Samarra, combined with an intensification of aerial assaults on Fallujah and Baghdad’s Sadr City, indicate a sudden change of strategy. The most likely explanation is twofold: first, fear that Samarra was slipping further away from the control of the Iyad Allawi regime and the US military, leading to a sense of urgency; second, the need to see whether Iraqi security forces could maintain control of a city once it had been pacified by US troops.

Paul Rogers will deliver a lecture on “The war on terror and the new American century: reflections on the US presidential election” at London’s Birkbeck College on 11 November 2004; for further details, click here

United States military sources have portrayed the extended attack on insurgents in Samarra as a success. Even in terms of brute force, this is questionable on two counts: whether the city will remain free of insurgent influence, and whether the assault itself was as effective as claimed. In the operation, the US deployed some 3,000 of its most experienced troops, and backed them with a wide range of weapons and equipment, including satellite and airborne reconnaissance. These forces had all the airpower they required and were further supported by 2,000 Iraqi soldiers.

On the other side, insurgent numbers were estimated at between 200 and (at most) 500, armed only with light weapons including rocket–propelled grenades. After three days of intense fighting, US sources reported that they had killed or captured up to 200 insurgents and that about 70% of the city was under their control. There was no independent corroboration of either figure.

Yet even if the figures are taken at face value (and previous US military statements have rarely been accurate), it is clear that the operations in Samarra proved less than a resounding success: 3,000 highly–trained and well–equipped troops backed by 2,000 local forces found it difficult to defeat a much smaller and lightly–armed force, with early indications suggesting that many of those involved in the insurgency simply melted away into the general population when the intensity of fighting diminished. This makes it probable that, even if US forces remain in the city in substantial garrison support of Iraqi forces, Samarra will be the site of further insurgent actions.

The lesson of the Samarra experience – as of the frequent raids on Fallujah and the increasing numbers of air assaults on Sadr City – seems to be that US strategists believe that they need to use heavy military power more generally against the insurgents now, rather than wait until after November’s election. In stark terms, the insurgency is now so serious that such actions cannot wait a month.

The war’s horror in every Arab home

These US actions and the resulting civilian casualties are reported daily on satellite news channels across the middle east. They come, moreover, at a time of intense Israeli military action in the northern parts of the Gaza strip, which have killed scores of Palestinians in levels of force that are remarkably similar to those employed in Samarra.

This news reporting, far more sustained and detailed than anything available on western news channels, clearly impacts on the already existing anti–American mood in the region. It also has a wider significance in relation to the development of al–Qaida and its many affiliates. Donald Rumsfeld may now concede that there was little evidence of any link between al–Qaida and Saddam Hussein link, and as yet – despite political claims and media flurries – there is little evidence that foreign paramilitaries are hugely significant in Iraq. At the same time, the intensification of the war in Iraq tends to sideline a number of developments elsewhere that point to the continuing power and future potential of the al–Qaida network – with implications for Iraq itself.

Al–Qaida: a network in transition

The bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta on 9 September is recent evidence of the continued capacity of al–Qaida affiliates in Indonesia, and a reminder of a more general feature vital to the understanding of the network. Even at the time of 9/11, al–Qaida was not a narrow hierarchical organisation but much more of a web of interconnected groups.

There was at that time degree of leadership and core planning based on Osama bin Laden and his immediate associates, and Afghanistan provided a centre for training, both in terms of the camps and by providing combat experience through the long–lasting civil war. But since the termination of the Taliban regime, al–Qaida has become much more dispersed – to the extent that it is close to being a franchise operation.

The wider al–Qaida movement derives a crucial advantage from this, in that it allows actions by loose affiliates to be presented as part of a coherent overall strategy. This is reinforced by the manner in which Vladimir Putin, Ariel Sharon, and sundry dictators or authoritarians elsewhere are content to put their own problems in the context of George W Bush’s “war on terror”.

Al–Qaida and its affiliates have also suffered real reversals, principally in the form of numerous deaths and detentions; on 26 September, an alleged leader of the group in Pakistan, Amjad Farooqi, was killed. Yet as a whole, the al–Qaida “phenomenon” seems still to be growing in terms both of military strength and popular support. A key development here is that al–Qaida and its associates are much more global than three years ago, not least because they are becoming a magnet for disillusioned and marginalised young people (mostly men) in western countries. Many are from within Islamic communities and some are converts to Islam, but all see a bleak future for themselves and consider that the al–Qaida version of radical Islam offers an alternative.

It is in this context that the al–Qaida circle starts to close, for Iraq presents an opportunity for the group to compensate for its “loss” of Afghanistan as a training–ground. The activities of external militants in Iraq is still small, but growing. In time, the campaign there is likely to provide a new theatre of combat experience that may become as effective for the al–Qaida movement as Afghanistan was in the 1990s.

In addition to his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click here

The blindness of power

George W Bush has spent most of the past two years insisting that the war in Iraq is part of the wider “war on terror”. In the narrow sense this was always nonsense; Rumsfeld’s latest admission is more confirmation than revelation of the paucity of evidence connecting Saddam Hussein and al–Qaida. The irony is that the actions of these men have created a situation where Iraq really becomes part of this wider war – but in a manner that is wholly counterproductive for the United States and its coalition partners.

In brief, the persistent reporting of the rising civilian casualties in Iraq, coupled with news of the Israeli actions in the occupied territories, is a gift to the al–Qaida cause. It is also one whose long–term effect is dangerously difficult to predict.

During the rest of October 2004, it is likely that US forces will continue to use their overwhelming firepower to try and stem the insurgency in Iraq. In the coming weeks their actions may have some effect. Similarly, Israel can act with near–impunity in Gaza, where further death and destruction may follow in the wake of its vigorous actions against Hamas and other radical groups.

Both sets of actions may create the appearance of military “success” and may even be hailed as important advances in the wider “war on terror”. In reality, as the consequences of these actions become widely known across the world, they will increase further the support for al–Qaida and its many partners and affiliates. That impact will be felt over an entirely different timescale – one measured in years not weeks.