Iran's Israeli factor

As the Iraq insurgency intensified during September 2004, some observers of United States military strategy expected that American forces would increase their attacks on key insurgent centres such as Fallujah; others offered the counter–argument that such assaults – which could lead to numerous civilian casualties, causing the Washington administration domestic political embarrassment at a sensitive time – were likely to be postponed until after the presidential election on 2 November.

The intense military action in Samarra at the beginning of October seemed to suggest that US leaders had decided on the first course, perhaps on the grounds that the insurgency was accelerating in such a manner that it would be too dangerous to wait until mid–November to attempt to suppress it (see last week’s article in this series, “America’s Iraqi shift: pre–emption or reaction?”).

Yet it now appears that the second prognosis, of a pre–election “pause” in assaults on insurgent centres, is indeed the more likely course (see Mark Mazzetti, “Major Assaults on Hold Until After U.S. Vote”, Los Angeles Times, 11 October 2004 – but with the qualification that the reduction of intensity in the US campaign is only relative.

The US’s military action is being conducted in the context of continuing violence across much of Iraq, with only the most damaging incidents reported in western media. In the past few days the US has conducted further air strikes on Fallujah, and an attack on a car on the main route between Fallujah and another centre of insurgent activity, Ramadi, is reported to have killed five members of the same family, including a child. After a mortar attack on Ramadi’s city hall and a neighbouring police headquarters that killed four people (including three police officers) US and Iraqi security forces launched raids on eight mosques in the city, and detained a leading local cleric, Sheikh Abd al–Alim al–Saadi.

Meanwhile, eleven members of the Iraqi national guard were killed and ten injured in an attack on a police station near al–Qaim, a city near the Syrian border; and a local council member was assassinated in the northern city of Mosul.

This continuing instability means that Iraq remains a controversial issue in the US presidential debate. But the impact of the relentless violence there on American politics is being matched by lower–profile but equally significant developments in a quite different arena – the relationship between the United States and Iran. Here, Washington has in the past two weeks transmitted two contradictory signals.

Iran: the view(s) from Washington

Two of the three members of the “axis of evil” proclaimed by President Bush in January 2002 continue to prove highly problematic for Washington to deal with. A bitter insurgency in Iraq continues eighteen months after the Saddam Hussein regime was terminated, while North Korea has probably developed a crude nuclear weapons capability, giving it an element of deterrence that would make any US move against it very dangerous. Yet amidst these difficulties, neo–conservative elements in Washington still regard the third part of the axis, Iran, as a high–priority policy target for “regime change”.

What is so significant in recent weeks about the US’s policy towards Iran is the combination of two impulses: an unexpected alignment with European initiatives that seek a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the crisis over Iran’s nuclear plans; and the provision of weaponry to Israel that would be particularly suited to an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.

The linkage with Europe – which appears to support a package being devised by Germany, France and Britain offering Tehran a series of economic incentives in return for a suspension of its uranium enrichment programme – starkly contrasts with Washington’s responses to previous European initiatives. At the core of the US’s suspicions about Iranian intentions is the belief that uranium enrichment for civil nuclear power could be diverted to a nascent nuclear weapons programme. The incentive package would therefore have to include the offer of reactor fuel; recent reports suggest that such a package may formally be proposed to Iran soon after 2 November.

This apparent change of attitude by the Bush administration towards Iran seems highly significant, especially in the light of other reports that neo–conservative hawks have been advocating a US strike on Iran’s nuclear industries; some even promoting it as a pre–election act, probably on the grounds that this could help secure a George W Bush victory. Any such risky action may have been forestalled by John Kerry’s emphasis on the dangerous effects of a military confrontation with Iran.

But the part of the US administration that seems more intent on a military solution over Iran has reason to be encouraged by the conclusion of a remarkably large arms deal with Israel. This deal, reported in detail in the specialist journal Defense News [4 October 2004 (subscription only)] involves a total of 5,000 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits; these are essentially an “add–on” mechanism capable of being fitted to a range of conventional bombs to make them hugely more accurate, and are particularly useful when fitted to earth–penetrating bombs that are designed to attack heavily–protected bunkers.

The JDAM deal is worth $319 million but it will not cost Israel a cent – it will be paid for through US military aid to Israel. It will be used to upgrade a range of Israeli weaponry: 500 one–ton earth–penetrating bombs, 2,500 conventional one–ton bombs, 1,000 half–ton bombs and 500 quarter–ton bombs. The Israeli air force already has a formidable armoury, but the addition of these forces gives it a greater capacity to attack the dispersed and protected facilities that are reported to be at the heart of the Iranian nuclear industry.

Israel’s determination to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons has been clear for some years; it was recently reaffirmed by Shaul Mofaz, Israel’s defence minister, who told journalists that “Israel would be prepared to use ‘all options’ to deal with the ‘Iranian threat’”. This policy recalls Israel’s attitude to Iraqi nuclear developments which culminated in its aerial bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in June 1981.

In military terms, the Iranian nuclear facilities are quite different, and would require Israel to take military action on a much larger scale. In the late 1970s, the Iraqis took the plutonium route to nuclear weapons, a method of producing fissile material that tends to be concentrated in large nuclear reactors. These present relatively straightforward targets, whereas the uranium route probably followed by Iran is easier to disperse across a number of sites.

In these circumstances, effective Israeli air attacks to disable Iran’s nuclear facilities would need several days and numerous strikes using hundreds of bombs – including precisely the kind of ordnance that will be available to Israel through the JADM deal. Such attacks would have a profound impact across the region, would be seen by the overwhelming majority of people there essentially as a joint US–Israel operation, and would probably have a particular effect on the Shi’a majority in Iraq.

Despite these probable consequences, however, many defence analysts believe that the Ariel Sharon government or its successor will indeed attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities within the next two or three years, and possibly much sooner. It follows that the alternative European policy towards Iran is especially important; any agreement that could be reached with Iran and that could be endorsed by the United States would make it far more difficult for Israel to undertake military action.

The view from Tehran

Beyond the immediate political and diplomatic dilemmas of the United States–Europe–Iran triangle is the question of the underlying Iranian motives for nuclear weapons acquisition, and it is here that the European proposals become problematic. From Tehran’s position, and not just among the conservative theocrats who currently have such influence, there is a fear – almost running to paranoia – that the country is deeply vulnerable and must have its own deterrent.

Although the United States has formidable problems in Iraq, its strategic position in the region is still powerful: it seeks to reinforce its nominal control of a country that is Iran’s immediate neighbour by building permanent bases in Iraq; its navy is in full control of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian sea; and it has a long–term military presence in Afghanistan.

The United States is a military ally of another of Iran’s neighbours, nuclear–armed Pakistan; and Pakistan contains serious divisions involving its Shi’a community, co–religionists of Iran’s majority. The US also has military facilities in Uzbekistan, only 500 kilometres beyond Iran’s northeastern borders; and Israel itself is seeking to extend its influence in Kurdish areas of Iraq, just across the border from Iran. All this is underpinned by the Bush administration’s depiction of Iran as part of an “axis of evil” where regime change is essential.

This sense of encirclement is an important component of the way Tehran views the world. Whether or not it helps explain previous or current Iranian involvement in Lebanon, and the more extreme theocratic statements about Israel, it certainly illustrates the very real problems involved in any attempt to ease tensions in the region.

For the moment, several European governments are seriously determined to avoid a military confrontation with Iran, and the recent shift in this direction by the Bush administration is welcome. But at the same time, the obstacles in achieving an agreement with Tehran are considerable, with one thoroughly unpredictable factor at their root.

The current Israeli government is likely to be entirely unconvinced by any agreement with Iran brokered by European states, and even to fear any such deal because it would limit Israel’s own scope for action. There is therefore a distinct possibility that Israel will choose to pre–empt the European diplomatic approach by means of an early military assault on Iranian nuclear facilities. This could come more quickly than anyone currently expects.