Questions for 2005

After the flurry surrounding the rout of the realists and the solidification of the neo–conservative hold on the administration, things have really died down here in Washington.

The Democrats still seem too despondent, too spooked by their loss, to begin to engage in the Wilsonian civil war that is bound to ensue in the New Year. Likewise, after a flurry of cabinet resignations and new appointments, the second–tier administration people have yet to be put into place, certainly in terms of the foreign policy team.

I always find such lulls interesting, because the Washington calendar is nothing if not predictable. Come January, with the inauguration and installation of the new Congress, possible Supreme Court appointments (perhaps even for Chief Justice), confirmation hearings, and the second–tier appointments being made, things are sure to go from zero to 100mph as they so often do. Washington is not a place of graceful and steady work transitions; as such, I have learned to enjoy the lulls as much as the periods of frenzy.

Such lulls lead me to think more long–term. It occurred to me now is an ideal time to ask the pointed questions, that if we could only get answers to, would really determine the shape of the world for the next decade or so. While I realize there is no chance any satisfactory answers can be gleaned by the time the holly is put away, such an intellectual exercise does more than while away a very quiet (except for the incessant holiday parties) rest of December. It sets out the intellectual landscape that will confront us when we all return from our much–needed breaks. So here goes:

1. The Middle East

Is the White House for real about the Middle East peace process? While some real learning has gone on here (largely due to the work of Prime Minister Blair), is the Bush administration willing to pressure the Israelis as much as it rightly does the Palestinians to achieve a lasting settlement?

The problem with the road map is that it calls for the Palestinians to do all the tough things first (become a viable democratic state under terrible conditions, crack down on Hamas and Islamic Jihad while maintaining the Palestinian Authority’s political legitimacy), before the rewards (a viable contiguous state) are reached. The Palestinians are just too traumatized for this to be realistic. Conversely, the problem with the Geneva plan and other European–sponsored offshoots is that they call for Israel to make all the concessions up front; the Israeli people are certainly too traumatized for this to work. Only if concessions are made at the same time, guaranteed by both the US and the Europeans, and confidence building is junked in favour of a comprehensive solution, is there a flicker of hope here. Also, are the Europeans and Arab rulers prepared to stop hiding behind the lack of such a settlement and put pressure on the Palestinians to make a decisive break with their past, or do they prefer to hide behind American mistakes rather than getting engaged in the process itself?

2. Transatlantic relations and the Doha free trade round

Does the EU have the gumption to finally face down French farmers and the French elite over the Doha free trade round? There is no deal at Doha without significant agricultural liberalization. There is no deal at Doha without the US and the EU, major free trade transgressors, acting in unison in making such concessions. It is time Europe stopped hiding behind the US President’s admittedly bad record on free trade. Yes, we are all sinners. Yes, the administration’s Steel and Agricultural subsidies plans were a huge step back. But, come on – we all know that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the root–of–all–evil here; it is by far the biggest and most pernicious single distortion in agricultural trade today. Without its reform, there will a huge backlash around the world. For the first time in years, the developing world is not mouthing nonsense about Che Guevara or dependencia economics – this is the real ideological victory of the Cold War. They are talking about trade, not aid; rule of law and foreign direct investment; opening the West’s markets so that the rest of the world has a chance to benefit from the blessings of free trade. Up to now, the West, in effect, is saying this: “We are glad you agree with us, and look forward to trading in financial services with you. But regarding agriculture, it’s just too hard. So although there are not a lot of financial services in Ghana or Mali (and there is a lot of agricultural production), I’m afraid you are just out of luck.” The rest of the world will never forgive us, and nor should they. But without Europeans doing more than shifting uneasily in their chairs when this comes up, failure is inevitable.

3. Transatlantic relations – the strategic and the political

In his remarkable Press Conference with Tony Blair, President Bush undoubtedly reached out a conciliatory hand to the Europeans, agreeing to step up pressure for a Middle East Peace Settlement, to visit Europe (and not just the parts that supported him in Iraq) soon after the inauguration, and to move toward closer relations with the recalcitrant allies. What have the Europeans done since to show that, they too, are serious about coming to terms with the US? Is the relationship likely to continue to fray, being dominated by competing theologies (differences over how to organize an economy, the value of military force in the international system, the relative importance of international institutions in the global arena, the value of sharing sovereignty versus preserving it, very different conceptions of political legitimacy).

These differences are likely to remain, as they emanate from genuine alternative historical and organic touchstones. But can we acknowledge this and still see that without engaging the US, on the global stage the European countries will have precious few global successes, and that, to a lesser extent, the same holds true for America? Can we work bottom–up, in an issues–centred manner and see that there are many areas where our common interests can be melded to achieve far better results than either could manage on its own (NATO reform, al–Qaida, Doha, Iran, the Middle East Peace Process, and even, dare I say it, in facilitating Iraqi reconstruction)? Europeans are always going on about the incredible efficacy of soft power: how about engaging America, thereby influencing the internal workings of the Bush administration and bolstering transatlantic allies for a change?

One could go on for hours. But these three areas: the Middle East Peace process, Doha, and transatlantic relations will influence other problems, such as Iran and North Korea, which ought to come to fruition in the New Year. In the end, these questions reinforce a wonderful and terrible blessing for mankind (or at least the mankind that is not Marxist). People and the decisions they arrive at ultimately make history. It is entirely up to us.