Missiles and militias

The United States’s missile–defence test failure in the Pacific on 15 December is the latest in a line of problems for a defence system that combines political momentum with severe under–performance.

In the test, a mock attacking missile was launched from Kodiak Island in Alaska, heading out over the Pacific towards the Marshall Islands from where the interceptor would be launched sixteen minutes later. But it never took off. Instead, the interceptor missile shut itself down twenty–three seconds from launch because of some systems hitch, aborting the whole process.

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This is even more of a problem for the US’s plans since this particular test was the first for two years and had been delayed for many months because of technical faults. Furthermore, three of the eight previous tests also failed.

Despite these hitches, the rapid development and deployment of a missile–defence system is a key aspect of the Bush defence posture – one that would be able to protect the continental United States from a small–scale missile attack, perhaps from a "rogue" state or, in the longer term, from China or Russia.

The initial idea is for twenty interceptor missiles to be based either in Alaska and California. These are very fast missiles that use advanced guidance and tracking systems to collide directly with incoming missile warheads, what is termed in the military jargon a “kinetic kill vehicle” – not carrying an explosive charge but destroying the incoming missile warhead by the force of the collision.

Many critics regard the whole idea of missile defence as a nonsense, pointing to the 9/11 attacks as being examples of asymmetric warfare, but supporters of missile defence were very quick to turn this argument on its head, claiming the 9/11 attacks simply proved that “people out there are out to get us”, and the United States must be protected from all possible threats.

The missiles being based in the US are part of a much wider programme that includes the airborne laser (see an earlier column in this series, “Directed energy: a new kind of weapon”, 31 July 2002) which would be used to protect American troops when based in the middle east or elsewhere. The overall idea is to have systems in place in a few years that make the United States and its forces overseas more or less protected from ballistic missile attacks, whether they be short–range missiles like the Scud, or long–range intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The high–tech trap

It sounds reasonable, but critics point to three key problems. The first is the claim that the real reason is that missile protection is actually intended to give the United States freedom of action wherever it sees it necessary to use force in pursuit of its international security aims. In other words, it would be totally unacceptable for the US to be deterred by lesser states that can field a handful of missiles. As such, missile defence is an essential part of the US policy of pre–emption.

The second criticism is that states like Russia and China will strongly oppose US missile defences as they will not be able to match such defences and will therefore face a superpower that has thousands of offensive nuclear weapons and will be able increasingly to protect itself from attack. Russia has already announced that it will seek to build new offensive missile systems designed to counter the US defences, and China is likely to expand its long–range nuclear missile force from the present number of around twenty to at least ten times that number, ensuring that it could “swamp” US defences and therefore maintain a balance of terror in any future confrontation. In other words, one outcome of the US programme could be to stimulate a new arms race.

The third argument is that even if the US successfully deploys missile defences, potential opponents – or those at the receiving end of US pre–emptive attacks – will resort to unconventional military responses, which could include “sponsoring” attacks like 9/11.

None of this is likely to have any effect on the Bush administration, but the Pacific test failure is making the whole missile–defence saga a much higher–profile issue. It might even signal a major setback for the entire programme, especially as the other high–profile system, the airborne laser, is experiencing development problems, delays and cost overruns.

Meanwhile, the Bush administration has deployed the first six missiles at Fort Greely and another at Vandenberg air force base in California. Ten more will be deployed in Alaska and three more at Vandenberg, though none of the existing missiles have been activated.

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It is probable that the Pacific test was timed to allow an announcement at the end of the year that the first missiles were ready for use, with President Bush proclaiming this new “defence” for the United States. Instead, the prospect is of further delays that coincide with a period of escalating costs in Iraq and Afghanistan and deepening worries – even in the Republican–controlled Congress – about the increasing pressures on the defence budget.

It is now at least possible that Congress will begin to consider cancelling programmes such as the airborne laser and even the US–based interceptor missiles. That stage has not been reached but it is no longer in the realms of fantasy. If it were to happen, it would be an extraordinary irony – some of the most advanced military technologies ever developed curbed by the impact of a bitter, intensifying insurgency in a country 10,000 kilometres from the United States. There, in spite of all its technologies and power, it is unable to cope with determined opponents relying on nothing more than rocket–propelled grenades, AK–47s, light mortars and suicide bombs.