A More Complicated Conflict with Unexpected Consequences
Following the retreat of substantial Taliban forces from most of Northern Afghanistan in the period 8-13 November, there was an expectation that the entire Taliban force would collapse relatively quickly. This was not a universally shared view, and an alternative analysis was that the withdrawal was at least partly strategic. By the end of the sixth week of the war, there appeared to be some support for the latter view, with Taliban forces still in control of Kunduz, and little sign of a collapse around Kandahar and in the four provinces still under Taliban control.
For most of the seventh week, the Taliban forces remained in Kunduz, with a progressive surrender or withdrawal only becoming apparent at the end of the week. Even then, some Taliban forces that had surrendered and had been moved to Mazar-e-Sharif, broke out of their camp and engaged local warlord forces with substantial loss of life, especially after the intervention of US strike aircraft. Furthermore, there had earlier been a short period of unexpected Taliban resistance close to Kabul itself.
These events all indicated that, in some circumstances, Taliban and associated forces might offer resistance, both to forces of the Northern Alliance (=United Front) or to other warlord groups or non-Taliban elements from the Pashtun areas. At the very least, the situation had become more complex.
In the southern Taliban-controlled provinces there seemed little sign that Northern Alliance forces, or their associates, would seek confrontation. Further inroads into Taliban areas of control would seem more likely only as a result of very intensive US air action, combined with US use of special forces and regular ground troops. The landing of a fairly substantial force of US Marines at Kandahar Airport on 25 November, and the subsequent establishment of a ground base, indicates that such a posture might now be under development.
There are indications that most Taliban forces have already withdrawn from Kandahar. While the United States may spend some days in building up its base near the city, the take-over of the city by local anti-Taliban forces (not Northern Alliance forces) may be rapid. This does not imply the end of the Taliban, with many already ensconced in well-armed locations in villages or in mountainous areas.
The United States and the Northern Alliance
In the past week it has become more clear that the US has been single-minded in its decision to work closely with the Northern Alliance elsewhere in Afghanistan, with substantial military advice being offered on the ground, a comprehensive re-arming process underway (largely from Russia) and much closer and more intensive use of air strikes.
At the same time, the anticipated cracks in Northern Alliance solidarity are becoming more obvious, and there are indications that substantial parts of Afghanistan are not under a united Northern Alliance control and have reverted to what amounts to warlord control. Even within the Northern Alliance itself, divisions are extending to something approaching warlordism.
This process of fragmentation, a local version of Balkanisation, will clearly make it more difficult for the UN and other agencies to help foster a united, broad-based Afghan polity. And it has three further likely consequences for drug production, arms importation, and legal order.
First, those areas under essentially local control, which are also suitable for growing opium poppies, are likely to see a substantial expansion in cultivation. Areas long controlled by the Northern Alliance were already witnessing a substantial increase in opium production, in contrast to the temporary cessation in Taliban areas. Some recent US air strikes have been directed at opium-processing facilities, but these will have only a short-term impact, as the lucrative trade will simply devolve to smaller, dispersed units.
The loss of Taliban control has resulted in previously hidden stocks appearing in Pakistan. These are likely to herald a substantial improvement in availability, bringing the price down in the major markets, especially Europe. Thus, one effect of US co-operation with the Northern Alliance, aside from the use of US ground troops to defeat the Taliban, will be substantially increased opium production in Afghanistan. This is virtually inevitable as local warlords seek sources of income to maintain their position and poor people seek their own sources of income at a time of serious food shortages.
Second, in recent weeks wide ranges of arms have flooded into Northern Afghanistan from Russia, and will cascade throughout much of the country. This will greatly aid the third factor, the partial breakdown of law enforcement and order.
Law, Order and the Taliban
In the last 2-3 years, the Taliban regime became intensely unpopular in much of Afghanistan, not least because of its theological rigidity, attitude to women, use of barbaric punishments and the often brutal suppression of dissent. At the same time, it is relevant to remember that the Taliban regime was initially welcomed as it gained control of much of the country because of the manner in which it dealt with warlords and banditry.
In other words, the Taliban imposed law (of a sort) and order on much of the country, after several years of disorder verging on chaos. As the Taliban has withdrawn, that form of repressive order has been replaced by widespread disorder that has already cost the lives of a number of foreign journalists and, no doubt, of many local people. It is a disorder made more dangerous by the almost universal availability of firearms, there is little prospect of the Northern Alliance imposing any systematic semblance of order, and there is little or no indication of a US interest in doing so.
One effect of this situation is to make the local delivery of aid shipments highly problematic. A number of agencies are reporting that it is easier to get shipments into central locations in Afghanistan, but much more difficult to distribute them to the areas in need because of banditry, looting and related problems.
In short, the US/Northern Alliance combination has successfully diminished Taliban control and has probably already damaged those elements of the al-Qaida network still present in Afghanistan (although most may have long since left). There has thus been progress in the two primary war aims of the United States.
At the same time, a parallel result has been disorder in much of the country, increasing factionalism, greater difficulties in distributing much-needed aid at a time of severe food shortages, and the likelihood of a substantial increase in heroin production for European markets.
The End of US Unilateralism?
One of the expected consequences of the 11 September atrocities was that the United States administration would see the need for much closer international co-operation in the pursuit of its security needs. Prior to 11 September, the Bush administration had shown a strong unilateralist orientation, including opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to planned negotiations on the control of the militarisation of space and to the proposed international criminal court. There were disagreements on the land mine ban, on UN proposals for the control of light arms transfers and on the continuation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and opposition to the protocol designed to strengthen the biological weapons convention. Most notably, there was a withdrawal from the Kyoto climate change protocols.
After an initial period in which it appeared that the trauma of 11 September would occasion a change of attitude, it now looks as if unilateralism is alive and kicking, and expressing itself in a number of ways. For example, the US did not even bother with representation at recent CTBT discussions, and its statement at the biological weapons talks in Geneva was notably hard-line. There were no indications of any willingness to change its attitude to the protocol that has been negotiated with painful difficulty over the past six years. Given that this protocol has attracted support from many states, including strong support in Europe, this is especially unfortunate.
More specifically, the United States has taken concrete steps in two other directions. One, mentioned last week, is the presidential directive that military courts be allowed to try suspected terrorists. The status of such prisoners would be determined by the president, with courts able to meet in secret, and overseas, and able to give sentences up to and including life imprisonment and the death penalty. This directive has caused some consternation among constitutional and international lawyers in the US, but is unlikely to be withdrawn.
The second issue concerns changed rules of operation for the CIA, removing a number of restrictions on modes of action originally put in place at the time of the Carter administration. The CIAs Special Operations Division, with its history of covert operations, coup support and targeted assassinations, is likely to become a key element in President Bushs War on Terrorism. In one sense, this represents a return to the days of the Cold War, except that the enemy is far less clear-cut than communist insurgents and their Soviet backers. Indeed, the enemy may have a far wider definition, taking in a wide rage of groups that appear to oppose US interests.
Extending the War
Although the future direction of the war in Afghanistan remains uncertain, there has been sufficient movement for there to be an indication of plans to extend the war to other states that are perceived to be harbouring groups associated with al-Qaida. These include, variously, Yemen, Somalia and Sudan. In the longer term, the more hard-line international security advisers in Washington remain absolutely convinced of the necessity of destroying the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, possibly by encouraging Kurdish and Shiite rebellions accompanied by an intensive and protracted bombing campaign against the Iraqi armed forces and their support systems.
Given the attitude of the administration and its long-term commitment to its war on terrorism, media speculation of an extension of the war should not be surprising. In view of the remarkable US military superiority in relation to any other state, let alone some of the poorest countries on earth, US action should certainly be possible.
There is, though, a note of caution. The United States administration still has a concern over casualties among its own troops and will therefore base future action primarily on air strikes. But the air war against the Taliban and al-Qaida has already used up precision-guided munitions at an extraordinary rate, so much so that there has had to be an emergency airlift of stocks from bases in Kuwait that would ordinarily be used for actions against Iraq.
US defence companies are already moving to surge production of such munitions, a singularly profitable endeavour, but it will take some time to build up stocks for further major military action in countries other than Afghanistan. Furthermore, the movement of ground troops around southern Afghanistan, now that a base has been established at Kandahar, will involve considerable air support, including the frequent use of precision-guided munitions.
In short, the rapid changes of the last two weeks have raised the possibility that the war is nearly over. This is not the view of military planners in Washington. Lengthy operations in Afghanistan going on over the winter, are still, on balance, more likely. The extension of the war to other parts of the world will be a longer term process. Indeed, in all probability, the war on terrorism will occupy most of the rest of President Bushs first administration, extending into his anticipated second term.
