Towards the end of 2002 it became evident that the crisis with Iraq was composed of three core elements.
The first was a deep-seated commitment by the more hawkish elements in the Bush administration to terminate the regime of Saddam Hussein. The motives were mixed, but they centred on the extreme geopolitical importance of Persian Gulf oil reserves (see an earlier article). That the regime might be developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons was significant, but there was the substantial added problem that it was doing so in a region of huge importance to Washington.
By the middle of December, the Pentagon had sufficient forces and supplies in the region to be able to go to war at about four weeks notice. The final build-up had not started, but it would be a rapid process once under way. It was also recognised that the window of military opportunity would last only until the spring. After that, climatic factors would make a military campaign difficult, and it would be politically undesirable to keep the forces in the region until the autumn.
The second element was the determination of the Saddam Hussein regime to avoid giving the United States any pretext for going to war. This included agreeing to a tough new process of United Nations (UN) inspections. It is true that the dossier delivered to the UN Security Council was primarily an 11,000-page repetition of earlier data, but there were early signs that the inspectors would be allowed to operate unhindered.
The third element in this complex process was the position of the UN itself. It became obvious that Kofi Annan and his professional staff were only too well aware of the huge dangers of a war with Iraq, both in terms of the regional stability of the Middle East but also in relation to the wave of populist anti-American sentiments that were echoing around the world. For this reason alone there was a determination on the part of the UN to make the new Unmovic inspection process as professional, rapid and detailed as possible.
A critical month
By early 2003, there have been significant developments in all three areas. The first is that the main phase of the final movement of American troops, aircraft and naval ships is now occurring. Units from the 45,000-strong First Marine Expeditionary Force are en route to the Gulf, and 11,000 troops from the US Army’s Third Infantry Division are also on their way. Headquarter units for the Marines and for the US Army’s V Corps are already established in the region.
Deployment orders have now gone out to four key USAF units - the 1st Wing with its F-15 interceptors, the 4th Wing with its long-range F-15E strike aircraft, the 49th Wing with its F-117 “stealth” strike aircraft and the 28th Wing with its B-1B strategic bombers. The B-1Bs will be based at the Thumrait Air Base in Oman, but some will be forward based in Kuwait during a war, with the intention of maintaining patrols over western Iraq to counter the launch of Scud missiles towards Israel. (see Aviation Week, 6 January 2003).
It looks probable that the US will have assembled about 100,000 troops by early or mid February, together with a substantial fleet that will include three or four carrier battle groups and the thousand-bed hospital ship, Comfort. While problems remain with the use of Turkish and Saudi bases, a large air force is being established in the region, with the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia (a British territory) being a key part of the whole process.
All this means that the United States will be able to attack Iraq any time from mid February onwards, and it will also have available a British amphibious force together with a small force of RAF planes. In military terms, the UK forces are of minor significance, but their political importance to the Bush administration is considerable, demonstrating that this would, to an extent, be an international force.
On the Iraqi side, there are some signs of preparations for war, not least in the form of some distribution of food reserves and drinking water supplies, coupled with clear indications of military deployments designed to ensure the protection of the key elements of the regime.
The Iraqis have also continued to be responsive to the demands of the UN inspectors, and it is in this area that the developments have been so marked. For just as the United States has put into operation the final preparations for a war, so it is clear that Kofi Annan and his UN staff have been working remarkably hard to avoid giving Washington a reason for war. The UNMOVIC inspection process has built up at a much faster rate than expected, and the teams have already ranged across much of the greater Baghdad region and are now branching out into other parts of Iraq (see the IAEA webpage).
They are aided by the setting up of regional UNMOVIC offices in Mosul and Basra, and by the use of a fleet of helicopters to enable them to stage surprise long-distance inspections. This process started with the use of three helicopters earlier this week to inspect a site close to the Syrian border, nearly 320 kilometres from Baghdad. Six of the eight UN helicopters are now operational and these are in addition to the ground-based inspections.
In addition to the long-range inspection, there were ten other inspections on the same day, including five missile facilities, a rocket propellant plant, a science department at the University of Baghdad and a medical centre.
There is no pretence that even this pace of inspections could result in a complete check of all potential sites, and there is recognition that it would need many months, if not years, for that to be completed.
At the same time, UN personnel are aware that the period up to 27 January, when Hans Blix delivers his first substantial report to the UN Security Council, is especially crucial. If a limited yet intense period of two months of inspections fails to lead to any conclusive evidence of Iraqi evasion, then there is a hope that this will make it difficult for the US to go to war.
Much will depend on the attitudes within the Security Council, and it is worth noting that Germany takes the chair for February, so we may see intense US activity in the period 27–31 January.
Humanitarian costs, political calculations
The obvious and intense efforts by the UN to try and avoid a war stem from two aspects of the crisis. One is the knowledge within UN aid circles that a war is likely to induce a humanitarian disaster. A recent internal UN assessment, a draft of which has been leaked (see www.casi.org.uk), includes a World Health Organisation assessment that a war would involve up to 100,000 direct casualties needing treatment and a further 400,000 indirect casualties.
Elsewhere, the report states that damage to electricity supplies is likely to mean that up to eight million people will not have ready access to safe drinking water, and three million people would need emergency feeding, the emphasis being on children and pregnant women. There would be up to 800,000 refugees, with 100,000 needing emergency aid.
These figures give some idea of the possible humanitarian consequences of a war, and they should come as little surprise given that some 14 million Iraqis currently receive external food aid.
The other issue facing UN staff is the recognition of the fragility of much of the region, not least because of the extensive reporting by al-Jazeera and other media channels of continuing Israeli action in the occupied territories.
The concerns go wider, with recent demonstrations against the war in six cities across Pakistan, where anti-American feelings have been further fuelled by the incident last week when a US plane struck a building on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan after a clash between a US patrol and Pakistani border guards.
The problem for the UN is that humanitarian issues and regional anti-Americanism count for little in Washington, where the determination to destroy the Saddam Hussein regime is as strong as ever. Even so, the extent and intensity of the Unmovic inspections is relevant, and a great deal will depend on whether the report due on 27 January gives any firm indication of an Iraqi ‘material breach’.
If there is no such indication, then it will be difficult for the US to get any kind of further UN mandate, meaning that it will have to go for military action as a unilateral process. In those circumstances, the attitude of Germany and especially Britain will actually become quite significant.
For Tony Blair, in particular, there will be the choice between partnering George W. Bush without a clear UN mandate, or withdrawing support at the risk of a fracturing of transatlantic relations. The indications, such as they are, seem to be that the British government will follow the former path, but the domestic consequences could be considerable.
Even so, although the British commitment of troops is not greatly significant in military terms, the political symbolism for Washington is substantial. The British prime minister is therefore likely to come under very heavy pressure to maintain his commitment to US action against Iraq, whatever his domestic concerns.
The Korean factor
One other factor has recently come into play that is providing real complications for the Pentagon – a potential crisis with North Korea. The official White House line is that this crisis is best handled by diplomacy, but there are also quiet military preparations already underway.
They are being developed with virtually no publicity, so as not to undermine the diplomatic moves, but they reflect the fact that North Korea is regarded as a far more powerful military opponent than Iraq.
In normal circumstances, the US Navy maintains a carrier battle group in the western Pacific ocean centred on the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. Because this was used as a base for special operations forces during the Afghan war, it may take up this role again next month, this time in the Middle East.
A “gap” of this kind in the western Pacific would normally mean replacement by another group, but there are indications that a much larger force comprising two carrier battle groups and two amphibious ready groups with several thousand US Marines are being sent to the region.
Furthermore, F-15E strike aircraft that are normally based in Alaska are not being called up for action against Iraq, in case they are required in a confrontation with North Korea.
There is an expectation that the crisis with North Korea can be scaled down through diplomacy, but the worry among the military planners is that the North Koreans may actually use the war with Iraq as an opportunity to test the United States to the limit.
The combination of a potential war with Iraq and a crisis over Korea is now a real possibility over the next three months, making for a period as tense and dangerous as anything since the Cuba missile crisis. This makes it even more important that alternatives to war, such as the current European Union initiative on Iraq, get all the support possible.
