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A case for demilitarizing the US military

15 years after the global war on terror was launched, America faces a deeply embedded (remarkably unsuccessful) version of militarism, and a seldom recognized crisis in civil-military relations.

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Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in 2004 poses for pictures with soldiers, marines and airman outside the Abu Ghraib Dete
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in 2004 poses for pictures with soldiers, marines and airman outside the Abu Ghraib Dete

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in 2004 poses for pictures with soldiers, marines and airman outside the Abu Ghraib Detention Center, in Iraq. Wikicommons/ US Air force. Some rights reserved. General Lloyd Austin, the outgoing head of US Central Command (CENTCOM), recently testified before Congress, suggesting that Washington needed to up its troop levels in Iraq and Syria. 

Meanwhile, in his own congressional testimony, still-to-be-confirmed incoming CENTCOM chief General Joseph Votel, formerly head of US Special Operations Command, seconded that recommendation and said he would reevaluate the American stance across the Greater Middle East with an eye, as the Guardian’s Spencer Ackerman put it, to launching “a more aggressive fight against the Islamic State.” 

In this light, both generals called for reviving a dismally failed $500 million program to train “moderate” Syrian rebels to support the US fight against the Islamic State (IS). They both swear, of course, that they'll do it differently this time, and what could possibly go wrong?