Firstly, as a sour prize for its poor efforts, Argentina received a higher amount than had previously been agreed (57 thousand million dollars). Secondly, the inflation and capping of the fluctuation of exchange rate goals were completely eliminated.
Finally, they allowed for the central bank to intervene in the exchange market, selling reserves in dollars to strengthen exchange rates.
It’s worth highlighting that the last measure was disproportionate, given that it is much like financing the powerful flight of capital with IMF dollars that until then had characterised the Argentine economy.
In this vein, the measure represented a clear violation of Article VI of the IMF statue, that prohibits the IMF from financing capital flight with its loans.
If that wasn’t enough, the altered version of the agreement also modified the timeline for payments. 90% of all resources loaned to Argentina were to be handed out in 2019, an electoral year, allowing the government of Macri almost complete control over these finances. Vice versa, Argentina only has to start paying back the loan in 2021.
In other words, it’s clear that in October 2018, the IMF made a clear and radical decision: to become a key political actor that would create the necessary conditions for the reelection of Macri.
In fact, the following months were characterised by unusual stability of the exchange rate, that left many observers thinking the crisis was coming to an end and that Macri was on his way to an easy victory, but things were much more complicated.
What was mistaken as the first signs of economic recovery were in fact the eye of the storm. Financial actors and investors continued to be wary, but accepted to change their behaviour due to the unconditional political support the Macri administration received from the IMF.
As such, the unprecedented intervention of the IMF has created an element of fragility in the Argentine financial system: if the IMF guaranteed their unconditional support to Macri, any kind of electoral setback would imply an immediate currency exchange race, given that economic actors have associated the end of Macri with the end of IMF assistance and thus, with the abrupt increase in the probability of an Argentine default.
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