Demonstrators hold an image of one of the young protesters killed on the third anniversary of Gezi Park protests. in Ankara, May 31, 2016. Press Association imag. All rights reserved.The last few days in Turkey have been nothing short of a nightmare. What many thought would never happen happened again: a military junta tried to overthrow the government. Whether it was due to a lack of coordination, the resolution of the coup coalition within the military to act at the last minute, or the thousands of people taking to the streets to stop the coup, the junta was—to everyone’s relief – unsuccessful. Many agree that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan will gain unlimited power from this, using the coup attempt to further curtail opposition and push through a regime change from a parliamentary to a presidential system. However, particularly western media has largely failed to take into account the role the AKP’s political base will play in this process and how it may change and direct the party’s and President Erdoğan’s future course.
Friday night, the night of the attempted coup d’etat, was the first time in the recent history of the Turkish Republic that such a large segment of conservatives and religious citizens went out to own the streets (apart from party meetings) in the name of democracy, or at least for their definition of democracy. Though some commentators and politicians have argued that different segments of society averted the coup together, displaying a rare show of political unity in Turkey, it is probably safe to say that most of the protestors at the scene of the attempted coup were either AKP voters or at least ideologically close to the AKP.
This matters because it has always been, since 2002, President Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan at the center of attention, with Turkish politics notoriously circling around his persona. The AKP has used Erdoğan’s political leverage not only to strengthen its rule in Turkey but also to push through a harsh neoliberal agenda. While the extent of social and political polarization in Turkey has guaranteed Erdoğan and the AKP high support in elections, it has been argued that in recent years the increasingly paternalistic style of both Erdoğan and the party, which has become somewhat ignorant of the daily challenges faced by Turkish citizens, has led to the party’s alienation of its political base. This also explains the loss of votes in the June 2015 elections.
