Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, al-Qaida and its often loosely affiliated networks have mounted many attacks across the world. The range, persistence and scale of these incidents send a stark message, one reinforced by the London bombings of 7 July that killed more than 50 people and injured 700.
The great majority of the attacks have been directed against western or Israeli/Jewish interests. Some have been massive in their effect, such as the Madrid (March 2004) and Bali (October 2002) operations; others could have been equally destructive, including the attempt to shoot down an Israeli tourist jet in Kenya (November 2002).
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There have been two attacks in Karachi, one against the United States consulate (June 2002) and the other killing eleven French naval technicians (October 2002). Istanbul was the site of two double bombings within a few days, against synagogues and against the British consulate and the HSBC bank (November 2003).
A synagogue bombing in Djerba, Tunisia (April 2002) killed twenty-one people (including fourteen German tourists); thirty-nine were killed in the multiple bombing of western targets in Casablanca (May 2003); twenty-nine died in the bombing of western compounds in Riyadh (May 2003); twenty-four died in separate attacks against the Marriott Hotel and the Australian embassy in Jakarta (August 2003).
An attempt was made to sink the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen (October 2002). There have also been attempts to target US embassies in Paris and Rome, and efforts to fuse multiple truck bombings of the financial district and diplomatic missions in Singapore with an attack on its international airport.
When all these attacks are put together it becomes clear that the al-Qaida network has maintained the capacity to sustain an international campaign of greater intensity and regularity that in the equivalent period before 9/11. At the same time, London marks the end of a second relative lull in its activities over the past four years. The first such period was the six months from November 2002 to May 2003, between the Kenya attack and the bombings in Casablanca; the more recent one lasted from October 2004 to July 2005, between the attack on the Taba Hilton in Sinai and Londons 7/7 atrocities.
Some analysts suggested that the long period since the Sinai attacks meant that the al-Qaida network was at last in decline, but others thought that it could be due either to an intended change in tactics or else a concentration on Iraq and Afghanistan. The consensus now is that the London bombs were probably an example of the further evolution of the movement that carries major implications for its future. As one perceptive article comments, the movement:
" has responded to four years of intense pressure from the United States and its allies by dispersing its surviving operatives, distributing its ideology and techniques for mass-casualty attacks to a wide audience on the Internet and encouraging new adherents to act spontaneously in its name" (see Steve Coll and Susan Glasser, "Attacks Bear Earmarks Of Evolving Al Qaeda", Washington Post, 8 July 2005).
A war of perceptions
In his address to the nation on 28 June, George W Bush made much of the relevance of Iraq to the global war on terror. Facing increasing opposition to the war within the United States, he was insistent that Iraq was now the real focus for the whole war. This is a common theme within the administration: Iraq has drawn in terrorists from across the Islamic world and it is there that they can be defeated. It is not a view shared by most security analysts, but the administration is right in a way that it does not intend. Iraq is indeed proving to be a remarkably powerful recruiting tool, by intensifying a bitter anti-American mood that is evident across the middle east and in diaspora communities in western Europe and elsewhere.
In his weekly openDemocracy column, Paul Rogers has transmitted the advice of the South Waziristan Institute of Strategic Hermeneutics to al-Qaida on the progress of its campaign:
The SWISH Report (1) (July 2004) The future looks bright. We insist, though, that much of this is due to the actions of your opponents
The SWISH Report (2) (January 2005) - You are, after all, in the early stages of a decades-long confrontation
A striking aspect of this trend - which is highly relevant to Britain too - is the diversification of global media. The reporting of events across the middle east and southwest Asia can easily permeate diaspora communities in the west. The reporting of the insurgency in Iraq is a case in point. In the British media, Iraq does get quite frequent mention, with perhaps three items a week that focus on the more devastating bombings, but with much less frequent mention of coalition counter-action.
By contrast, the middle-east satellite channels provide detailed coverage almost by the hour, and pay almost as much attention to United States actions as to the attacks by insurgents. Depictions of earlier perceived anti-Islamic campaigns - Serbs in Bosnia, Russians in Chechnya or Israelis in the occupied territories - have all had some effect, but the impact of Iraq is far greater.
What makes Iraq so potent is not just the raw facts but how they can be expanded, manipulated and developed into much wider conspiratorial frameworks. The reality in Iraq is devastating enough perhaps 25,000 civilians killed and 70,000 injured in a little over two years (see www.iraqbodycount.net) but its dissemination, interpretation and exaggeration on militant websites can add greatly to its power to move. If there is clear evidence of prisoner abuse, torture and death in custody, including this week's further revelations from Guantánamo, then the websites can quickly turn that into a cause for ideological outrage (see Josh White, "Abu Ghraib's Tactics First Used at Guantánamo", Washington Post, 14 July 2005.)
The core development is that the manner in which the global war on terror is conceived and fought, especially the occupation of Iraq, is failing in both negative and positive ways. It is not curbing the capabilities of the al-Qaida movement, and it is at the same time greatly aiding the networks ability to recruit new followers.
The long and the short term
The London attacks may be particularly significant in this context. Although the analysis at this stage has to be tentative, it is likely that the events of the last four years have made a sufficient impression on a very small minority of young men in countries like Britain as to produce a potential generation of suicide/martyr bombers.
A fusion between these young men and experienced and technically competent operators, possibly from abroad, would be very difficult to counter. It would also have implications that stretch well beyond Britain. This may be yet another example of the evolution of the al-Qaida network, a process that is proceeding faster than the ability of traditional counter-terrorism methods to respond. Once again, in the London tragedy, we see the urgent need to address the reasons why Bush's global war on terror is proving so deeply counterproductive. A week after the London attacks, there is little sign of that.
