Indian Shiite Muslims protest against conflict in Iraq, June 2014. Demotix/Rajat Gupta. All rights reserved.Iraq more than three years after the US withdrawal and more than one year since ISIL or ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, which initially called itself Al Qaida in Iraq AQI - seized Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, is grappling with an increasingly menacing existential threat by a heavily armed and increasingly barbarous ISIL, which on Jun 10, last year surged towards Baghdad, seizing large swathes of territory, including Tikrit and Iraq’s second largest city Mosul.
Buoyed by the recent resounding victory in wresting control of the highly strategic province of Diyala, the Iraqi government launched, on Mar 1, a full-scale offensive to drive ISIL out of its vital stronghold of Tikrit, which undoubtedly has not only an immensely symbolic significance as the hometown of toppled dictator Saddam Hussein, but also crucially controls the highway linking Baghdad to Mosul. The Pro-Government Force (PGF) consists of army units, Sunni tribesmen and the increasingly powerful Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) – which includes Shia Militias and volunteers – making up the bulk of the anti-ISIL alliance.
The Pentagon’s highly unusual statement, explicitly emphasizing that the US was not providing any air power in support of the Tikrit operation left no doubt that the US has not only been fiercely against it, but trying its utmost to publicly distance itself from it. This came hard on the heels of another highly damaging public rift: when, alarmingly, on Feb 19, a senior Central Command (CentCom) official explicitly advertised that Iraqi forces backed by US air support intended to stage an all-out assault on Mosul in April or May. But, within a few hours CentCom declared that it would not be able to train enough men in time. It has become increasingly apparent that the US deliberately made the two announcements, aiming to thwart the Tikrit offensive by sending out the following unmistakable messages: First, the US adamantly refused to provide air support to an Iraqi force that it has not directly trained, let alone one spearheaded by PMF. Second, it was vehemently opposed to any attempt to drive ISIL out of the Sunni heartland by a force that is, not merely overwhelmingly dominated and spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shia militias, but far more alarmingly, guided by Gen. Qassem Suleimanni, the commander of the elite Quds force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.
