The legal structure of Irans Islamic Republic is anti-democratic to the core. Its constitution contains the terminology of democracy: parliament, various levels of elections, and three branches of government. But the manner in which Irans theocrats define these terms deprives the system of any democratic substance.
First, an independent judiciary a core principle of democracy cannot exist when Irans supreme leader appoints the head of its judiciary. This figure in turn appoints all judges and can remove them at will; this fact alone undermines the chances of their being independent and impartial.
Mehrangiz Kar is responding to Mohsen Sazegaras proposal for a referendum on a new Iranian constitution, Irans road to democracy
Iranians present a wide range of responses in our debate, Democracy & Iran
For an introduction to openDemocracys debate, see David Hayess Iran between revolution and democracy
Please post your responses in our discussion forum; and if you can afford it, send openDemocracy a donation so that we can continue to facilitate dialogue among Iranians and keep it free
Second, Irans majlis (parliament) enjoys no independence under the Iranian constitution. The Council of Guardians, consisting of religious leaders appointed by the supreme leader, has veto power over all the legislation it approves. The council can veto any democratic law passed by the majlis as a violation of sharia law. Moreover, members of parliament are not fully independent; candidates must undergo a strict vetting process overseen by the Council of Guardians. For the same reason, the presidential elections too cannot be classified as part of a free and democratic process.
Third, the executive powers of Irans president are very limited in comparison with the supreme leader, to whom the constitution grants absolute and unlimited powers. The Assembly of Experts indirectly elects the supreme leader, but its members in turn must have their candidacy to this body approved by the Council of Guardians.
This institutional structure does not have the capacity to generate democratic laws in line with international human-rights standards, nor to adopt mechanisms that could implement fair legislation.
What is more, this structure is in conflict with current social developments in Iran. Today, 65% of the Iranian population is under the age of 30, making it one of the youngest countries in the world; more than 50% of university students and more than 60% of graduates are female; there have been major advances in higher education and adult literacy, and increasing migration to urban areas. All these processes have transformed the Iranian social landscape.
This new population of Iran is not satisfied with an undemocratic regime neither its structure, nor its forms of rule, nor the violent mechanisms often used to maintain it. Thus, people welcomed and used the limited opening up of space for freedom of expression during the reform period after 1997.
A characteristic of the reform period was increasing student organisation and criticism of the status quo. In July 1999, a spontaneous student protest in response to the closure of the reformist newspaper Salam ended in a violent crackdown against students including arbitrary arrests and heavy prison sentences for student leaders. The student movement never recovered. The judiciary went on to attack press freedoms.
After such violent state and judicial reactions to democratic trends and activists in Iran, in the name of the Islamic constitution, some thinkers and scholars concluded that reform is impossible under the current constitution. As a result, these reformers invited Irans people to ask for a general referendum in order to re-evaluate and change the current constitution.
