But ending violence against women isn’t low-hanging fruit. It is probably the hardest, most Sisyphean cause of all – as the US Supreme Court’s decision to strike down women’s right to abortion has once again made clear. Violence against women is a function of the patriarchal power inequality between men and women: women are subjected to violence to keep them in their place, controlled, scared, exploited.
To reduce violence against women, we must chip away at the patriarchy itself and shift power to women. This is no mean feat.
Change must be fought for and negotiated across society, through raising awareness, mobilising citizens, winning allies, building movements and eventually majorities, so that elected officials are motivated or at least feel compelled to enact laws and enforce them – and will be held accountable.
We cannot hope to reduce violence against women by skipping normal political processes and instead going with depoliticised, fast-tracked technocratic trickery.
The Istanbul Convention lends itself well to the transactional ‘reforms for benefits’ dance that the EU performs with countries seeking integration. Ratification is a neat, easily measurable act, convenient for commission officers monitoring progress against a list. It symbolises the generic “EU-ropean” modernity required of aspirants to be deemed worthy of EU engagement, and fits perfectly into the commission’s strategy of geopolitics of human rights.
But the Istanbul Convention is short on direct impact and accountability. Victims cannot take the convention to the police or a court and demand to be protected. It needs to be translated into domestic laws, which then need to be enforced and paid for.
Even in countries where the political system is not distorted by external actors’ conditionality, full implementation of the Istanbul Convention has remained elusive, with no meaningful consequences for state parties failing in their obligations.
For women and girls facing gender-based violence in Ukraine, this does not bode well. The Istanbul Convention was ratified without genuine political will or the constituencies that generate it. Who will now ensure its implementation?
The ‘European Incentive Model’
Beyond the Istanbul Convention, there is the greater question of whether the EU’s incentive-based, transactional transfer of norms works – both for transferred norms (will those laws be implemented?) and democracy (will democracy be strengthened?).
At the time of EU enlargement into east-central Europe in 2004, a number of political scientists proposed that the incentive of EU membership and the very process of absorbing EU laws had enabled accession countries to stay the course in their challenging democratic and economic transition.
This so-called ‘European Incentive Model’ (scrubbed of the nuance and caveats of the original research) became a triumphalist creed about the power and ingenuity of EU enlargement. Its grip on EU elites remains strong, even as many of the newer EU member states have been backsliding on democracy and the rule of law, and further enlargement has turned into a quagmire.
Watching the European Incentive Model from where my grassroots activist colleagues in Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia sit, I am left wondering whether it doesn’t, in fact, undermine democracy rather than strengthen it.
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