How can intentional atrocities toward civilians be reduced in times of widespread political violence? Six years ago, we set out to discover if the International Criminal Court (ICC) has delivered results, on the ground. The research we produced (in an upcoming article for the journal International Organization), marks the first quantitative evidence that the ICC does—under the right conditions—have a deterrent impact. But our research also reveals that the ICC faces significant difficulties. Because passions relating to the Court run high, we conducted a systematic assessment of the Court’s impact. We found important evidence that the Court contributes to the deterrence of intentional civilian killing; indeed, just enough evidence to justify the international community’s support for the ICC’s work. Not enough, unfortunately, to suppose that deterrence can work if this institution labors without significant support from the rest of the world.
Building on existing research on both criminology and deterrence, we developed a conditional deterrence theory of the ICC. We hypothesized that the ICC would reduce violence where it has jurisdiction, when the ratification was backed by domestic laws, and importantly, when the Court begins to investigate allegations of atrocities. Those institutional supports could enhance “prosecutorial deterrence” by increasing the chances that perpetrators would face punishment for their crimes. Before the ICC began to operate, many faced nothing but impunity. We also conjectured there would be evidence of “social deterrence”—extralegal pressure brought into focus by the norms the Court represents. We proposed that the change in social milieu would be moderated by human rights mobilization as well as aid relationships.
