February 2014: Estonian troops parade in Tallinn in celebration of Independence Day. (c) Liis Treimann / AP / Press Association Images. All rights reserved.The crisis in Ukraine has readjusted the balance in relations between Russia and Euro-Atlantic institutions. As the ceasefire wavers in Ukraine, further north, in the Baltic states, a series of alarmist commentaries in the regional, as well as international press hint that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania may become the next target for Russia’s engagement in its “near abroad”. In terms of policymaking, this alarmism has spurred the intensification of military cooperation among the Baltic states under the umbrella of NATO.
Meanwhile, in an apparent reformulation of the 1993 “Karaganov Doctrine”, which stated that Russia must utilise ethnic Russian minorities within the post-Soviet space as a vehicle to exert political pressure on the newly independent republics, the Kremlin has been active in winning hearts and minds among Latvia’s and Estonia’s Russian communities. As part of this endeavour, the utilisation of pro-Kremlin media-outlets (such as Russia Today, Ren TV Baltic, and Sputnik News) and informative websites has been of pivotal significance.
But what has the actual impact of the “information war” been on Estonia's ethnic Russians, and the younger generation in particular? The younger generation is the best qualified and most mobile component of Estonia’s Russian minority. External commentators often rush to overlook the internal dynamics within the Russian minority, which makes up a quarter of Estonia’s population, and, by extension, overstate the tangible impact of Russia’s information war against Estonia.
