Thomas Cromwell, as painted by Hans Holbein the Younger (1497/1498–1543)
An uncomfortable reality of the Brexit referendum was that the English comprise over 80% of the UK electorate. England’s choice, therefore, was almost certain to be that of the whole country – regardless of the popular vote in the other three constituent nations. Except for Greater London, every English region voted Leave, a result that commentators have generally sought to explain by pointing to perceptions of local advantage or distress, and to regional disparities of income, wealth, education, and social class. All of these factors may have had some relevance, but none of the explanations account for the fact that both the most and the least prosperous regions of England voted Leave, as did those with the most and least numbers of immigrants – supposedly a key factor. Even regions like Cornwall that benefit from substantial EU funding, and those heavily dependent on exports to Europe like the North East opted for ‘Out’ – apparently against their own interests.
What we have perhaps failed to grasp in attempting to elucidate Brexit, is that England, in particular, has passed this way before, centuries earlier and with arguments that are strikingly similar to the ones employed during the campaign. We have become accustomed to thinking of our relationship with Europe largely in transactional and political terms. In so doing, we tend to overlook the baggage we carry from the past, the ideas of who we are and where we belong – which are not artificial constructs but patterns of emotive thinking inherited with each nation’s language and culture. Failure to recognise the historical roots of Euroscepticism in England is a failure to understand one of the fundamental reasons why so many English voters put their cross in the Brexit box.
