When the forces of Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” invaded Ukraine on 24 February there were three aims. Most important was a rapid assault on and occupation of Kyiv, leading to the fall of the government of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and its replacement with a pro-Putin regime. The second was to occupy northern Ukraine eastwards to the city of Kharkhiv; and then, thirdly, to consolidate control of the four oblasts (provinces) of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, linking up with Crimea in the south.
Direct occupation of the great majority of Ukraine would be unnecessary because, in the view of the Kremlin, there would be widespread support for the new government in Kyiv, with the country welcoming liberation from its ‘neo-Nazi’ regime.
The end result would have been the extension of Russian military power westwards to the borders with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Along with the adjacent client state of Belarus and aided by forward-based Russian nuclear forces in both states, this would be a strategic re-drawing of Central Europe and an important step in the evolution of a renewed Greater Russia and the creation of a Russia-led Eurasian superpower.
