By late March last year, barely a month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war was already at a stalemate. And this is where we are now, at the end of the war’s first year. Russia can’t win because NATO has its global standing on the line and will support Ukraine to the end, but Ukraine and NATO cannot win for fear of a Russian nuclear escalation.
As a recent report in Culturico makes clear, part of the myth of stable nuclear deterrence rests on the assumption that nuclear powers would never consider using nuclear weapons first. But that is certainly not the posture of Russia or, for that matter, NATO.
The prospects for negotiations look minimal and a long-term violent stand-off is all too plausible, but many questions still remain. Has Russia lost global status? Can it maintain its army at the level needed given its formidable losses to date? Can its current rate of armaments production be maintained? And what changes might be under way in terms of domestic support for Vladimir Putin?
